Tex. 2011 Opinions authored by Chief Wallace B. Jefferson

2012 JUDICIAL LIAISON ASSIGNMENTS FOR CHIEF JEFFERSON:
Judicial Council (Chair) (statutory)
Judicial Districts Board (Chair) (statutory)
Texas Indigent Defense Commission (statutory)
Judicial Committee on Court Funding (Chair)
Board of Regional Presiding Judges

2011 Opinions by Chief Jefferson

LAST UPDATED: 10/21/11

Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, No. 09-0223 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011)
(Opinion by Jefferson)(attorney's fees and DJA, declaratory judgment action, economic loss rule)
SHARYLAND WATER SUPPLY CORPORATION v. CITY OF ALTON, CARTER & BURGESS, INC., CRIS
EQUIPMENT COMPANY, AND TURNER, COLLIE & BRADEN, INC.; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-06-
00038-CV, 277 SW3d 132, 02-05-09)
The Court affirms in part, reverses and renders in part, and reverses and remands in part the court of
appeals' judgment.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court
View Electronic Briefs 09-0223 SHARYLAND WATER SUPPLY CORP. v. CITY OF ALTON (including
multiple amicus briefs)

Texas A&M University - Kingsville v. Yarbrough,
No. 09-0999 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson)
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY - KINGSVILLE v. MELODY YARBROUGH; from Kleberg County; 13th district (13-
07-00744-CV, 298 SW3d 366, 09-24-09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice
Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, and Justice
Johnson joined. [pdf]
Link to e-briefs: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY - KINGSVILLE v. YARBROUGH

In Re State of Texas, No. 10-0235 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(Chief Jefferson)
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-10-00121-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03-31-10)
The Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
Link to e-briefs: (including multiple amicus briefs): IN RE STATE OF TEXAS

City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC,
No. 08-0265 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson)
(takings claim against government precluded given existence of statutory remedy)
We expect our government to retrieve stolen property and return it to the rightful owner. What happens,
though, when a person claims an interest in property the government has seized? In this case, the City of
Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for their
return. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 47.01a(a). Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the company
sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation. We hold that
the availability of the statutory remedy precludes a takings claim. We reverse the court of appeals’
judgment and render judgment dismissing this suit.
Conclusion. VSC received all of the process to which it was entitled. A party cannot claim a lack of just
compensation based on its own failure to invoke a law designed to adjudicate such a claim. We reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the case. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(c).
CASE DETAILS: CITY OF DALLAS v. VSC, LLC; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-05-01227-CV, 242 SW3d 584, 01-04-08)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Justice David Medina,
Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Don R. Willett, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Dale Wainwright delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Phil Johnson and Justice Eva M. Guzman joined.
[pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 08-0265 CITY OF DALLAS v. VSC, LLC

City of Dallas v. Stewart, Heather,
No. 09-0257 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Chief Wallace B. Jefferson)
(administrative resolution of nuisance abatement dispute not preclusive, judicial review available, takings
claim)
Urban blight threatens neighborhoods. Either as a risk to public health or as a base for illicit activity,
dilapidated structures harm property values far more than their numbers suggest. Cities must be able to
abate1 these nuisances to avoid disease and deter crime. But when the government sets up a mechanism
to deal with this very real problem, it must nonetheless comply with constitutional mandates that protect a
citizen’s right to her property.
Today we hold that a system that permits constitutional issues of this importance to be decided by an
administrative board, whose decisions are essentially conclusive, does not correctly balance the need to
abate nuisances against the rights accorded to property owners under our constitution. Independent court
review is a constitutional necessity. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment, but on different grounds.
Conclusion. That the URSB’s nuisance determination cannot be accorded preclusive effect in a takings suit
is compelled by the constitution and Steele, by Lurie and its antecedents, by the nature of the question and
the nature of the right. The protection of property rights, central to the functioning of our society,26 should
not—indeed, cannot—be charged to the same people who seek to take those rights away.
Because we believe that unelected municipal agencies cannot be effective bulwarks against constitutional
violations, we hold that the URSB’s nuisance determination, and the trial court’s affirmance of that
determination under a substantial evidence standard, were not entitled to preclusive effect in Stewart’s
takings case, and the trial court correctly considered the issue de novo.
We affirm the court of appeals judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(a).
CASE DETAILS: CITY OF DALLAS v. HEATHER STEWART; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-07-01244-
CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-11-08)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Nathan L. Hecht,
Justice David Medina, Justice Don R. Willett, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Phil Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Paul W.
Green, and Justice Eva M. Guzman joined. [pdf]
Justice Eva M. Guzman delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Paul W.
Green, and Justice Phil Johnson joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 09-0257 CITY OF DALLAS v. STEWART [including 3 amicus briefs]

Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,
No. 09-0420 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Chief Wallace B. Jefferson)(challenge to electronic voting
without paper record)
Technology is changing the way we vote. It has not eliminated controversy about the way votes are
recorded and verified. We must decide whether voters have standing to pursue complaints about an
electronic voting machine that does not produce a contemporaneous paper record of each vote. Because
we conclude that most of the voters’ allegations involve generalized grievances about the lawfulness of
government acts, and because their remaining claims fail on their merits, we reverse the court of appeals’
judgment and render judgment dismissing the case.
Conclusion. The voters raise legitimate concerns about system integrity and vulnerability. But these are
policy disputes more appropriately resolved in the give-and-take of politics. Perhaps the Secretary will
decide, as California has, to de-certify certain DREs. Perhaps the Legislature will require a
contemporaneous paper record of votes cast, or perhaps Texas will curtail or abandon DRE use altogether.
But we cannot say the Secretary’s decision to certify this device violated the voters’ equal protection rights
or that the voters can pursue generalized grievances about the lawfulness of her acts. “Vindicating the
public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of [the Legislature] and the Chief Executive.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. We reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the case. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(c).
CASE DETAILS: ESPERANZA ANDRADE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF
TEXAS v. NAACP OF AUSTIN, NELSON LINDER, SONIA SANTANA AND DAVID VAN OS; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-
08-00076-CV, 287 SW3d 240, 04-10-09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 09-0420 ESPERANZA ANDRADE v. NAACP OF AUSTIN

Ojo v. Farmers Group Inc., No. 10-0245 (Tex. May 27, 2011)(Green)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to this Court the following question:
Does Texas law permit an insurance company to price insurance by using a credit-score factor that has a racially disparate
impact that, were it not for the [McCarran-Ferguson Act],1 would violate the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19,
absent a legally sufficient nondiscriminatory reason, or would using such a credit-score factor violate Texas Insurance Code
sections 544.002(a), 559.051, 559.052, or some other provision of Texas law?
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., 600 F.3d 1201, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). Pursuant to Article 5, section 3-c
of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1, we answer that Texas law prohibits the use of race-
based credit scoring, but permits race-neutral credit scoring even if it has a racially disparate impact.
PATRICK O. OJO, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. FARMERS GROUP, INC., FIRE
UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FARMERS UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, AND
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
The Court answers the question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Justice Green delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina,
Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined, and in which Justice Willett joined as to Parts I, II, III.A-B, IV,
and V. [pdf]
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
So what does the Court’s survey of legislative history tell us today? The Court makes no attempt to
construct the statute’s meaning by looking at its history. Instead, it gives us information that, while not
essential to our interpretation of the Insurance Code, is far from irrelevant: “The legislative history of the
credit scoring bill and the arguments of its opponents indicates that the Texas Legislature was aware of the
possibility of a disparate impact on racial minorities, yet did not expressly provide for a disparate impact
claim as it did in the Texas Labor Code.” ___ S.W.3d at ___. Thus, we are told that the statute says what it
says because the Legislature intended that meaning. This fact has no bearing on our interpretation, and we
would interpret clear language the same regardless of whether or not the Legislature had given thought to
the specific issue before us. The inclusion of this history gives notice to those who feel wronged by the
statute. The remedy they seek requires engagement in the political process, on the legislative battlefield.
Moreover, it gives those same aggrieved citizens some indication of why the Legislature would have made
the choice that it did, allowing them to hone their advocacy. For those who support the statute, this
language’s relevance is much the same. This guidance will not harm democracy, our reputation, or the bar,
and indeed it may help.
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
See Electronic Briefs in 10-0245 PATRICK O. OJO v. FARMERS GROUP, INC.

Nafta Traders Inc. v. Quinn, No. 08-0613 (Tex. May 13, 2011)(Hecht)
“The answer to most questions regarding arbitration ‘flow inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of
contract between the parties.’”1 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., that the grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 “are
exclusive” and cannot be “supplemented by contract”.3 The principal questions in this case are whether the Texas General
Arbitration Act (TAA)4 likewise precludes an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if
not, whether the FAA preempts enforcement of such an agreement. We answer both questions in the negative and
consequently reverse the judgment of the court of appeals5 and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
NAFTA TRADERS, INC. v. MARGARET A. QUINN; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-07-00340-CV, 257
SW3d 795, 06-17-08)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice
Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Willett, Justice Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice Wainwright and Justice
Lehrmann joined.
This case asks whether parties can agree to “try” a case privately, but then enlist state courts to review the
decision for reversible errors of state or federal law. I agree with the Court that the agreement is
enforceable under the TAA, Hall Street notwithstanding. ___ S.W.3d at ___. I write only to observe that our
system is failing if parties are compelled to arbitrate because they believe our courts do not adequately
serve their needs. If litigation is leaving because lawsuits are too expensive, the bench and the bar must
rethink the crippling burdens oppressive discovery imposes. If courts have yet to embrace modern case-
management practices, the Legislature should ensure that the justice system has resources to improve
technology and to hire qualified personnel—two sure ways to improve efficiency. [pdf]
See Electronic Briefs in 08-0613 NAFTA TRADERS, INC. v. QUINN

In Re Universal Underwriters of Texas Inc. Co., No. 10-0238 (Tex. May 6, 2011)(Jefferson)
Appraisal clauses, a common component of insurance contracts, spell out how parties will resolve disputes
concerning a property’s value or the amount of a covered loss. When the parties disagree, but neither
seeks appraisal until one has filed suit, has the party demanding appraisal waived its right to insist on the
contractual procedure? Because we conclude that, absent conduct indicating waiver and a showing of
prejudice, it has not, we conditionally grant relief.
We have held that mandamus relief is appropriate to enforce an appraisal clause because denying the
appraisal would vitiate the insurer’s right to defend its breach of contract claim. In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins.
Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002). There, as here, “the parties . . . agreed in the contracts’ appraisal
clause to the method by which to determine whether a breach has occurred,” and, if the appraisal
determined that the full value was what the insurer offered, there would be no breach of contract. Id. The
same is true here. We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to grant Universal’s
motion to compel appraisal.5 See id. (holding that refusal to order appraisal would “den[y] the development
of proof going to the heart of a party’s case and cannot be remedied by appeal”). We are confident the trial
court will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.
IN RE UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS OF TEXAS INSURANCE COMPANY; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-10-00013-
CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03-23-10)
stay order issued April 23, 2010 lifted
The Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
(Justice Lehrmann not sitting)
See Electronic Briefs in 10-0238 IN RE UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS OF TEX. INS. CO. (multiple amicus briefs)

Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, No. 09-0326 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2011)(Jefferson)
The Local Government Code requires a person suing a county to give the county judge and the county or
district attorney notice of the claim. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 89.0041. The plaintiff provided that notice here,
but did so by personal service of process, rather than registered or certified mail as the statute
contemplates. We conclude that when the requisite county officials receive timely notice enabling them to
answer and defend the claim, the case should not be dismissed. Because the court of appeals concluded
otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
LARRY ROCCAFORTE v. JEFFERSON COUNTY; from Jefferson County; 9th district (09-08-00420-CV, 281 SW3d 230, 03-05-
09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, Justice
Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined, and in which Justice Willett joined as to parts I
through III. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
See Electronic Briefs in 09-0326 ROCCAFORTE v. JEFFERSON COUNTY

RR Comm'n v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water,
No. 08-0497 (Tex. Mar. 11, 2011)(Guzman)
The Texas Water Code requires the Railroad Commission of Texas to weigh the “public interest” in the permitting of
proposed oil and gas waste injection wells. In a ruling, the Commission declined to consider traffic-safety factors in its
public interest inquiry. We determine whether the Commission’s interpretation of “public interest” is entitled to judicial
deference. Because we conclude the Commission’s construction of the phrase was reasonable and in accord with the plain
language of the statute, we hold the court of appeals erred in not deferring to the Commission’s interpretation. We therefore
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for the petitioners in accordance with the trial court’s original
judgment.
The court of appeals failed to grant deference to the Commission’s interpretation of “public interest” in section 27.051(b)(1)
of the Water Code and instead held the Commission abused its discretion in its construction of the statute. Because we
conclude the Commission’s interpretation of the phrase “public interest” is reasonable and in accord with the plain meaning
of the statute, we hold the court of appeals erred in refusing to defer to the Commission’s construction of the term.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for the Commission and Pioneer in accordance
with the trial court’s original judgment.
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS AND PIONEER EXPLORATION, LTD. v. TEXAS CITIZENS FOR A SAFE FUTURE AND
CLEAN WATER AND JAMES G. POPP; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-07-00025-CV, 254 SW3d 492, 12-06-07)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, Justice
Green, and Justice Johnson joined. [pdf]
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Willett
and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
View Electronic Briefs 08-0497
RAILROAD COMM'N OF TX v. TX CITIZENS FOR A SAFE FUTURE AND CLEAN WATER