Tex. 2011 Opinions by Justice Don R. Willett

2009 Opinions by Justice Willett including Dissents and Concurrences

Flood gate arm pointing toward oncoming traffic that impaled driver's car and severely
injured passenger not a "special defect" and thus not actionable under the TTCA:
Denton County v. Beynon, No. 08-0016 (Tex. May 1, 2009)(Willett) (Texas Tort Claims Act TTCA
governmental immunity waiver, special defect hazardous road condition s)
DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS v. DIANNE BEYNON AND ROGER BEYNON, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL.; from
Denton County; 2nd district (02-07-00066-CV, 242 SW3d 169, 11-29-07)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the case.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister,
Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice O'Neill delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Medina joined.

In Interest of JOA, No. 08-0379 (Tex. May 1, 2009)(Medina)(termination of parental rights appeal,
constitutionality of statement of points requirement for appeal)
IN THE INTEREST OF J.O.A., T.J.A.M., T.J.M., AND C.T.M., CHILDREN; from Collingsworth County; 7th
district (07-07-00042-CV, 262 SW3d 7, 02-25-08)
The Court modifies the court of appeals' judgment, affirms the judgment as modified, and remands the
case to the trial court.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.

Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fi re Ins. Co., No. 07-0760 (Tex. Apr. 21, 2009)(Willett)
(insurance coverage dispute, intentional injury exclusion)
GREG TANNER AND MARIBEL TANNER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF K.T. AND R.T.,
MINOR CHILDREN v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; from Caldwell County; 11th
district (11-05-00371-CV, 232 SW3d 330, 08-09-07)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Brister delivered a dissenting opinion

Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 06-0867 (Tex. 2009)(Willett)
(insurance coverage dispute, duty to defend not triggered by allegations in suit)
PINE OAK BUILDERS, INC. v. GREAT AMERICAN LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY; from Harris County;
14th district (14-05-00487-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07-06-06) 2 petitions
The Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the
trial court.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

2008 Texas Supreme Court Opinions by Justice Willett, Dissents and
Concurrences

FISCAL YEAR PRODUCTIVITY IN REVIEW: Over the course of the fiscal year, which ended
Aug. 31, 2008, Justice Willett turned in 21 signed opinions, which break down as follows: 8
majority opinions, 7 concurring opinions, 4 dissents, 2 opinions concurring and dissenting in part.
No per curiam opinions were reported for Willett.

In re Caballero, No. 07-0484 (Tex. Dec. 19, 2008)(Green)(attorney discipline, BODA discretion,
disbarment or suspension when attorney on probation for criminal conduct)
IN THE MATTER OF ROLANDO CABALLERO
The Court affirms the judgment of disbarment.
Justice Green delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Medina joined.

In Re Global Santa Fe Corp., No. 07-0040 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) (Willett) (silica litigation, Jones Act
preemption issues)
IN RE GLOBALSANTAFE CORPORATION; from Harris County; 14th district (14-06-00625-CV, ___ SW3d
___, 12-19-06)
The Court conditionally grants the petition for writ of mandamus.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, No. 05-0466 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Hecht)
(oil and gas, trespass, rule of capture)
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice
Jefferson joined, and in Part I of which Justice Medina joined.

Forest Oil Corp v. McAllen, No. 06-0178 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Willett)(arbitration, commercial contact,
fraudulent inducement claim barred by contractual waiver of reliance language)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Medina joined.

Don's Building Supply, Inc. v. Onebeacon Ins. Co., No. 07-0639 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Willett)
(certified questions)(insurance coverage dispute, duty to defend, eight corners rule, belated discovery of
residential construction defect)
DON'S BUILDING SUPPLY, INC. v. ONEBEACON INSURANCE COMPANY, AS ASSIGNEE OF POTOMAC
INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS
The Court answers the questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Interest of MN, a Child, No. 07-0698 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Johnson)
(termination of parental rights, appellate procedure, extension to file statement of points for appeal)
IN THE INTEREST OF M.N., A CHILD; from Taylor County; 11th district
(11-06-00228-CV, 230 SW3d 248, 05-10-07)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that
court.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion in In Interest of MN (Tex. 2008).

Frymire Engineering Co. v. Jomar International, No. 06-0755 (Tex. June 13, 2008)(Willett)
(equitable subrogation standing, construction law, contractors, indemnity)
FRYMIRE ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC. BY AND THROUGH REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. JOMAR INTERNATIONAL, LTD. AND MIXER S.R.L.; from Dallas
County; 5th district (05-04-01717-CV, 194 SW3d 713, 05-30-06)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court.
Justice Don R. Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

FKM Partnership, Ltd. v. B oard of Regents of Univ. of Houston System, No. 05-0661 (Tex. Jun 6, 2008)
(Phil Johnson) (eminent domain, condemnation, implications of reduction of amount of land to be taken on
land owner's recovery of fees, partial nonsuit)
FKM PARTNERSHIP, LTD., A TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON SYSTEM; from Harris County; 14th district (14-03-00392-CV, 178 S.W.3d 1,
04-14-05) 2 petitions
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

First American Title Ins. Co. v. Susan Combs, No. 05-0541 (Tex. May 16, 2008)(Majority Opinion by
Don Willett) (regulation of the insurance business, taxation of out-of-state insurers, retaliatory tax)
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY AND OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY v. SUSAN COMBS, COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND
GREGG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-04-00342-CV,
169 S.W.3d 298, 06-03-05)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice O'Neill, Justice
Green, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Hecht delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice
Medina joined.

Lewis, MD v. Funderburk, No.. 06-0518 (Tex. Apr. 11, 2008) (Brister) (Med-Mal , interlocutory appeal)
RORY LEWIS, M.D. v. DEWAYNE FUNDERBURK, AS NEXT FRIEND OF WHITNEY FUNDERBURK; from
Limestone County; 10th district (10-05-00197-CV, 191 S.W.3d 756, 04-05-06)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court.
Justice Brister delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
Wainwright, Justice Medina, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined.
Justice O'Neill delivered a concurring opinion.
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.

In Re Bazan, No. 06-0952 (Tex. Mar. 28, 2008)(Medina)(mandamus)
(removal of local official based on criminal conviction, ethics in government)
IN RE EDUARDO "WALO" GRACIA BAZAN;
from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-06 00616-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 11-01-06)
stay order issued November 30, 2006, lifted
The Court denies the petition for writ of mandamus.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice
O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion in In Re Bazan, No. 06-0952 (Tex. Mar. 28, 2008)

PR Investments and Special Retailers, Inc. v. Texas, No. 04-0431 (Tex. Feb. 15, 2008)(Justice
Willett) (condemnation, construction law, change in plans for condemned property, jurisdiction of trial court,
sanctions)
PR INVESTMENTS AND SPECIALTY RETAILERS, INC. v. THE STATE OF TEXAS; from Harris County; 14th
district (14-00-00091-CV, 180 S.W.3d 654, 10/13/05)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Don R. Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, PA v. Crocker, No. 06-0868 (Tex. Feb. 15, 2008)(Justice
Willett) (insurance coverage, additional insured, notification)
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURG, PA v. BEATRICE CROCKER; 5th district
The Court answers the questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court.

AIC Management v. Crews, No. 05-0270 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008)(O’Neill) (eminent domain, condemnation, real
estate law, sufficiency of legal description, UDJA, jurisdiction of Harris County Civil Courts at Law)
AIC MANAGEMENT v. RHONDA S. CREWS, CURTIS CALDWELL CREWS, ANNETTE CREWS, DENISE
CLAUDEN CREWS, AND CLAUDE CREWS, JR., THE HEIRS OF EMMA CREWS, VALDA CREWS, AND
EVA FAY GROSS, AND ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; from Harris County; 1st district
(01-03 01178-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02-03-2005) (Opinion of the First Court of Appeals - by Higley)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Willett filed a concurring opinion.

City of Rockwall, Texas v. Hughes, No. 05-0126 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008) (Johnson) (annexation, arbitration
construction of statutory provision governing arbitration of municipal annexation disputes)
THE CITY OF ROCKWALL, TEXAS v. VESTER T. HUGHES, AS SOLE INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF W. W. CARUTH, DECEASED; from Rockwall County; 5th district (05-04-01562-CV, 153 S.W.
3d 709, 01-20-2005)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, and Justice Brister
joined.

Paj, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co., No. 05-0849 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008)(Opinion by Justice O'Neill)
(insurance law, effect of failure to comply with notice of claim requirements, prejudice)
PAJ, INC. D/B/A PRIME ART & JEWEL v. THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY; from Dallas County; 5th
district (05-04-01047-CV, 170 S.W.3d 258, 08/26/05)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment, renders judgment in part, and remands the case to the
trial court in part.
Justice O'Neill delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Brister, Justice
Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, and Justice
Johnson joined.

AIG Aviation v. Holt Helicopters, Inc. No. 06-0484 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2008) (Dissenting opinion on reh'g by
Justice Willett) (construction of aviation insurance contract)
AIG AVIATION (TEXAS), INC. AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH,
PENNSYLVANIA v. HOLT HELICOPTERS, INC.; from Uvalde County; 4th district (04-05-00291-CV, 198 S.
W.3d 276, 04/26/06)
Dissenting opinion by Justice Willett

TEXAS SUPREME COURT OPINIONS BY
JUSTICE DON R. WILLETT

2012 LIAISON ASSIGNMENTS FOR JUSTICE WILLETT:
Task Force to Ensure Judicial Readiness in Times of Emergency
Texas Center for Legal Ethics
Grievance Oversight Committee
Texas Center for the Judiciary

2011 Willett Opinions

LAST UPDATED: 12/20/2011

City of Dallas v. Parker, No. 07-0288 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(Opinion by Phil Johnson)
(public employment, immunity of governmental entities)
This appeal involves issues of governmental immunity from suit. With the exception that this matter is a class action, which
does not affect our analysis or conclusions, and one argument that we address separately, the material facts, procedural
background, issues, and arguments presented are similar to those we considered in City of Dallas v. Albert, ___ S.W.3d
___ (Tex. 2011). Thus, our conclusions and holdings are the same as those in Albert.
In addition to arguments made in Albert and addressed above, the Officers in this case assert that the City’s immunity from
suit is waived because the suit implicitly involves the validity of pay resolutions adopted by the city council. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b) (“In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance . . . the municipality
must be made a party . . . .”). However, the Officers’ pleadings do not support this contention. Their pleadings reference the
ordinance as having become a term of their employment contracts and two resolutions as possible bases for calculating
their damages. They do not question the validity of either the ordinance or a resolution.
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
CITY OF DALLAS v. DAVID S. MARTIN AND GEORGE G. PARKER, ET AL.; from Rockwall County; 5th district (05-03-01310-
CV, 214 SW3d 638, 12-21-06) 2 petitions
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Phil Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright,
Justice David Medina, Justice Paul Green, Justice Eva Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion
Link to Electronic Briefs in this case, including amicus brief by State of Texas: 07-0288 CITY OF DALLAS v. MARTIN

Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, No. 09-0901 (Tex. Aug. 26,
2011)(Opinion by Justice Don R. Willett)
TEXAS RICE LAND PARTNERS, LTD. AND MIKE LATTA v. DENBURY GREEN PIPELINE-TEXAS, LLC; from
Jefferson County; 9th district (09-09-00002-CV, 296 SW3d 877, 09-24-09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
Link to e-briefs: TEXAS RICE LAND PARTNERS, LTD. v. DENBURY GREEN PIPELINE-TEXAS LLC
(including briefs by several amici)

AEP Tex. Central Co. v. PUC,
No. 08-0634 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Justice Don R. Willett)(PUC utilities law)
This appeal challenges a final order of the Public Utility Commission in a true-up proceeding under
Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code, a part of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA). The district court
affirmed the order in part and reversed it in part. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court in part and reversed it in part.1 In two recent decisions, we have reviewed PUC orders in true-up
proceedings, giving a general description of Chapter 39 and the true-up procedure
In today’s case, AEP Texas Central Co. (AEP), a transmission and distribution utility, and CPL Retail
Energy, L.P., its affiliated retail electric provider, initiated a proceeding under Section 39.262 to finalize
stranded costs and other true-up amounts. The State of Texas, several municipalities, and several other
parties who are consumers of electricity or represent consumer interests (collectively the Consumers),
intervened in the proceeding.
In its final order (Order), the PUC determined stranded costs, which generally are “based on the difference
between the book value of generation assets and the market value of these assets.”5 The PUC also made
a separate determination of the capacity auction true-up under Section 39.262(d)(2). The issues before us
now concern market value, net book value (NBV), and the capacity auction true-up.
Conclusion. We grant the petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, affirm in part and reverse
in part the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand this case to the PUC for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
CASE DETAILS: AEP TEXAS CENTRAL COMPANY v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ET AL.; from Travis County;
3rd district (03-07-00196-CV, 258 SW3d 272, 06-27-08) 4 petitions
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument,
the Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment, and remands the case to the Public Utility
Commission.
Justice Don R. Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 08-0634 AEP TEX. CENT. CO. v. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF TEX. [including three amicus
briefs]

Tyler Scoresby, MD v. Santillan,
No. 09-0497(Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Justice Don R. Willett)(HCLC med-mal suits, expert report
deadline extension, curing of defective reports)
The Medical Liability Act entitles a defendant to dismissal of a health care liability claim if, within 120
days of the date suit was filed, he is not served with an expert report showing that the claim against him
has merit. The trial court’s refusal to dismiss is immediately appealable. The Act sets specific requirements
for an adequate report and mandates that “an objective good faith effort [be made] to comply” with them,5
but it also authorizes the trial court to give a plaintiff who meets the 120-day deadline an additional thirty
days in which to cure a “deficiency” in the elements of the report. The trial court should err on the side of
granting the additional time and must grant it if the deficiencies are curable. The defendant cannot seek
review of this ruling or appeal the court’s concomitant refusal to dismiss the claim before the thirty-day
period has expired.
Conclusion. We conclude that a thirty-day extension to cure deficiencies in an expert report may be
granted if the report is served by the statutory deadline, if it contains the opinion of an individual with
expertise that the claim has merit, and if the defendant’s conduct is implicated. We recognize that this is a
minimal standard, but we think it is necessary if multiple interlocutory appeals are to be avoided, and
appropriate to give a claimant the opportunity provided by the Act’s thirty-day extension to show that a
claim has merit. All deficiencies, whether in the expert’s opinions or qualifications, are subject to being
cured before an appeal may be taken from the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case.
CASE DETAILS: TYLER SCORESBY, M.D. v. CATARINO SANTILLAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SAMUEL
SANTILLAN, A MINOR; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-08-00357-CV, 287 SW3d 319, 04-30-09) 2 petitions
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Nathan L. Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice David
Medina, Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva M. Guzman, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Don R. Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
Justice Phil Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 09-0497 TYLER SCORESBY, M.D. v. SANTILLAN

LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction Inc., No. 09-0794 (Tex. Jun. 17, 2011)(Willett)(charter school
a governmental unit for tort claims purposes)(interlocutory appeal of immunity ruling permitted).
Since 1995, open-enrollment charter schools have been a part of the Texas public-school system. These
nontraditional public schools, created and governed by Chapter 12 of the Education Code, receive
government funding and comply with the state’s testing and accountability system, but they operate with
greater flexibility than traditional public schools, in hopes of spurring innovation and improving student
achievement.
This interlocutory appeal poses a narrow issue: Is an open-enrollment charter school a
“governmental unit” as defined in Section 101.001(3)(D) of the Tort Claims Act1 and thus able to
take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction? We answer
yes. An open-enrollment charter school qualifies under the Tort Claims Act as an “institution, agency, or
organ of government” deriving its status and authority from legislative enactments.3 Accordingly, it may
bring an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the interlocutory
appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand to that court to reach the merits of the school’s immunity
claim.
Conclusion. Open-enrollment charter schools are governmental units for Tort Claims Act purposes
because: (1) The Act defines “governmental unit” broadly to include “any other institution, agency, or
organ of government” derived from state law;70 (2) the Education Code defines open-enrollment charter
schools as “part of the public school system,”71 which are “created in accordance with the laws of this
state,”72 subject to “state laws and rules governing public schools,”73 and, together with traditional public
schools, “hav[ing] the primary responsibility for implementing the state’s system of public education;”74
and (3) the Legislature considers open-enrollment charter schools to be “governmental entit[ies]”75 under
a host of other laws outside the Education Code.
Accordingly, because Universal Academy is a “governmental unit” under the Tort Claims Act, the court of
appeals had jurisdiction to hear Universal Academy’s interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).76
Our holding does not resolve the underlying issue of whether Universal Academy enjoys immunity from C2’
s contract claim. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the appeal and remand to that
court for further proceedings.
LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. D/B/A UNIVERSAL ACADEMY v. C2 CONSTRUCTION, INC.; from Dallas
County; 5th district (05-07-01469-CV, 288 SW3d 31, 02-02-09)        The Court reverses the court of
appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green,
Justice Johnson, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Guzman delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Medina joined.
[pdf]
See E-briefs in 09-0794 LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. v. C2 CONSTRUCTION, INC.

In re Reece, No. 09-0520 (Tex. May 27, 2011)(Guzman)
It is well-rooted in our jurisprudence that contempt is a broad and inherent power of a court. But, we have also recognized
that despite the breadth and necessity of that power, it is a power that must be exercised with caution. Today, we decide as
a matter of first impression whether a trial court may hold a litigant in contempt for perjury committed during a deposition.
We are further presented with a question arising from the bifurcated nature of the Texas judiciary and our limited habeas
jurisdiction: whether we should exercise our mandamus jurisdiction to provide a forum for a civil litigant who is deprived of
liberty pursuant to a court’s contempt order, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to exercise its habeas
jurisdiction.
In the underlying civil case, the relator was held in contempt and confined for perjuring himself during a deposition. The
relator challenged his confinement by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court
declined to exercise its jurisdiction citing, among other things, the civil nature of the case. The Court of Criminal Appeals
directed the relator to pursue his remedies in this Court. Because we lack habeas jurisdiction in this case, the relator
pursued relief by filing the instant petition for writ of mandamus to challenge his confinement.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by holding the relator in contempt for perjury occurring during a deposition,
because such perjury did not obstruct the operation of the court. Further, because the underlying suit is civil in nature, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant the relator leave to file a habeas petition in that court, we hold the relator has
no adequate remedy by appeal and therefore mandamus is the appropriate remedy to correct the trial court’s abuse of
discretion. We conditionally grant relief.
IN RE COY REECE; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-09-00609-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-11-09)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied
motion to revoke bond denied
The Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Medina, Justice Green, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Johnson joined as to Part IV. [pdf]
Today’s case [sparks] a game of jurisdictional hot potato between us and our constitutional twin, the Court
of Criminal Appeals. Truth be told—and this particular truth has been told repeatedly—the State’s entire
Rube Goldberg-designed judicial “system” is beyond piecemeal repair; it should be scrapped and rebuilt
top-to-bottom. That said, and however labyrinthine the jurisdictional maze often is, the answer in today’s
case seems straightforward: This dispute belongs with our sister court. It arrived on our doorstep because
of a simple yet pivotal misunderstanding: the Court of Criminal Appeals’ mistaken belief that we have
unfettered habeas jurisdiction and are thus equally able to grant habeas relief.1 We do not,2 and the
Court today is unified 9-0 on that point (though the Court does not explicitly mention our sister court’s
misinterpretation). We part ways 7-2 on whether we should make lemons out of jurisdictional lemonade by
wiring around our habeas limitation and relabeling the relief sought “mandamus.”
The mandamus remedy turns on two findings: legality and practicality.3 On both scores, I would return this
case to the court that conceded two years ago that it “does have the authority to act in this case.”4 Statute
and precedent strongly suggest we cannot hear this case, but even if we can, practical considerations
advise we should not. Neither refusing nor resisting, the Court today yanks tighter a Gordian knot that
should be cut clean through. I respectfully dissent, and, for good measure, exhort the Legislature to
propose a judiciary worthy of Texas.
See Electronic Briefs in 09-0520 IN RE COY REECE

Ojo v. Farmers Group Inc., No. 10-0245 (Tex. May 27, 2011)(Green)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to this Court the following question:
Does Texas law permit an insurance company to price insurance by using a credit-score factor that has a racially disparate
impact that, were it not for the [McCarran-Ferguson Act],1 would violate the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19,
absent a legally sufficient nondiscriminatory reason, or would using such a credit-score factor violate Texas Insurance
Code sections 544.002(a), 559.051, 559.052, or some other provision of Texas law?
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., 600 F.3d 1201, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). Pursuant to Article 5, section 3-c
of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1, we answer that Texas law prohibits the use of race-
based credit scoring, but permits race-neutral credit scoring even if it has a racially disparate impact.
PATRICK O. OJO, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. FARMERS GROUP, INC., FIRE
UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FARMERS UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION, AND
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
The Court answers the question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Justice Green delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina,
Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined, and in which Justice Willett joined as to Parts I, II, III.A-B,
IV, and V. [pdf]
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
The Court is right that today’s outcome is dictated by the Insurance Code as it is written. That being so, I wish the Court
were more inhibited to do what we have prohibited—mine extratextual clues to illuminate an already-unambiguous statute.
Text alone does not answer every question, but it answers many, including today’s, as the Court concedes. I accept a
cautious (and non-villainous) role for extrinsic aids, including certain legislative history, where a nebulous statute is
susceptible to varying interpretations,1 but our rule for unambiguous statutes is uncomplicated: “Where text is clear, text is
determinative,”2 making any foray into extratextual aids not just inadvisable but, as we have repeatedly derided it,
“inappropriate.”3
The Court nowhere states—or even suggests—the Insurance Code is ambiguous. But even assuming arguendo it is,
“thus justifying cautious use of secondary construction aids,”4 the Court beckons some strange ones, including some we
have consistently decried as patently unreliable (like failed bills in a subsequent Legislature). The Court’s detour may be
well meaning, but it is not well supported, and I regret its “disparate impact” on our interpretive precedent. I would hold to
our holdings—when the Legislature speaks plainly, the judiciary should as well. In other words, and applying a rule less
prudish than prudent, if it is not necessary to look further, it is necessary not to look further. An unembellished interpretation
of an unambiguous statute can be spare without being sparse. For these reasons, I agree with all but Part III.C of today’s
opinion.
The Court’s textual analysis is clear and incisive, and I join it unreservedly. The meaning of the Insurance Code is apparent
from its language, read in context, especially as contrasted with the Labor and Government Codes, both of which explicitly
allow disparate-impact liability. All in all, though, I wish the Court were more allegiant to our longstanding interpretive
precedent. We should treat similar cases similarly, not disparately. Given the rise of state legisprudence, we owe
interpretive clarity—and consistency—to the courts below us, the litigants before us, the citizens beside us, and the cases
beyond us.
(Justice Hecht not sitting)
See Electronic Briefs in 10-0245 PATRICK O. OJO v. FARMERS GROUP, INC.

Nueces County, Tx v. Ballesteros, No. 09-0561 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2011)(Willett dissent from denial
of PFR)
For reasons explained in my concurrence today in Roccaforte v. Jefferson County,1 I respectfully dissent
from the Court’s denial of Nueces County’s petition for review. My view in Roccaforte is that Jefferson
County effectively waived Roccaforte’s noncompliance with the mandatory post-suit notice requirements of
Local Government Code Section 89.0041 by failing to raise it “as soon as possible.” As we have stated,
“The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but
that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived.” In Roccaforte, Jefferson County
litigated for two-plus years before asserting defective notice, raising it only after limitations had expired. In
this case, however, Nueces County immediately objected to Ballesteros’s noncompliance in both its plea to
the jurisdiction and its motion to dismiss. Accordingly, I believe Nueces County was entitled to mandatory
dismissal under Section 89.0041(c).
NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS v. JOE GUADALUPE BALLESTEROS; from Nueces County; 13th district (13-06-
00405-CV, 286 SW3d 566, 05-14-09) as redrafted
Justice Willett dissents to the denial of the petition for review. [pdf]
See Electronic Briefs in 09-0561 NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS v. BALLESTEROS

Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, No. 09-0326 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2011)(Jefferson)
The Local Government Code requires a person suing a county to give the county judge and the county or district attorney
notice of the claim. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 89.0041. The plaintiff provided that notice here, but did so by personal service of
process, rather than registered or certified mail as the statute contemplates. We conclude that when the requisite county
officials receive timely notice enabling them to answer and defend the claim, the case should not be dismissed. Because
the court of appeals concluded otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
LARRY ROCCAFORTE v. JEFFERSON COUNTY; from Jefferson County; 9th district (09-08-00420-CV, 281 SW3d 230, 03-
05-09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina,
Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, and Justice Lehrmann joined, and in which Justice Willett joined as to
parts I through III. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
I join Parts I–III of the Court’s opinion. As for Part IV, I join the result but not the reasoning. There is a better
approach, one more allegiant to the Legislature’s words. Roccaforte’s claim should proceed, but the
reason is rooted not in his substantial compliance but rather the County’s substantial dalliance.
The Court’s understandable desire to work an eminently fair result has led it to revise the statute as
desired rather than read it as enacted. I favor a different approach to the same outcome. Roccaforte
should win not because the Court waived the Legislature’s words but because the County did.
See Electronic Briefs in 09-0326 ROCCAFORTE v. JEFFERSON COUNTY

State of Texas v. PUC, No. 08-0421 (Tex. Mar. 18, 2011)(Willett)
This complex case poses several vexing questions regarding Texas utility-deregulation laws and the Public
Utility Commission’s application of those laws. In short, numerous parties — the State of Texas, utility
companies, municipal groups, consumer groups, and others — challenge the Commission’s interpretations
of various cost-recovery provisions in Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code. As detailed below, we affirm the
court of appeals’ judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand to the PUC for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL. v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ET AL.; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-05-
00557-CV, 252 SW3d 1, 04-17-08)
3 petitions
The Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment, and remands the case to the Public Utility
Commission.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in No. 08-0421 THE STATE OF TEXAS v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMM'N OF TEXAS

Reid Road MUD No. 2. v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., No. 09-0396 (Tex. Mar. 11, 2011)(Johnson)
In this case we address two evidentiary questions. The first is whether an employee of the corporate general partner of a
limited partnership qualifies to testify about the fair market value of partnership property under either the Property Owner
Rule or Texas Rule of Evidence 701. The second is whether the condemning authority in a condemnation proceeding
adopted the damages opinion of an appraiser by presenting the appraiser’s testimony and written appraisal in the special
commissioners’ hearing.
Under the record before us, we answer the first question “No,” the second question “Yes,” and affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the damages opinion LaBeff expressed in his affidavit. However, the
court erred by excluding Ambrose’s testimony and appraisal as to Speedy Stop’s damages.
We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for further
proceedings.
REID ROAD MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 2 v. SPEEDY STOP FOOD STORES, LTD.; from Harris County; 14th district
(14-07-00225-CV, 282 SW3d 652, 02-03-09)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
(Justice Guzman not sitting)
View Electronic Briefs 09-0396
REID ROAD MUNICIPAL UTILITY DIST. NO. 2 v. SPEEDY STOP FOOD STORES, LTD.