2011 TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES
DECIDED WITH UNSIGNED OPINIONS
DECIDED WITH UNSIGNED OPINIONS
2011 Texas Supreme Court Per Curiam Opinions (in reverse chronological order) ---> All 2011 Opinions to date by Supreme Court of Texas Also see ---> January - June 2011 Tex. Sup. Ct. Opinions 2010 Texas Supreme Court Per Curiam Opinions 2009 Texas Supreme Court Per Curiam Opinions LAST UPDATED: 10/21/2011 Opinions Issued December 16, 2011 Lowell v. City of Baytown, TX, No. 07-1011 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam opinion)(firefighter litigation, governmental entities, no immunity to claim prospective injunctive relief brought against government official in official capacity) Petitioners are firefighters for the City of Baytown. They sued the City, claiming that it improperly calculated pay for certain assignments in violation of the Firefighter and Police Civil Services Act. The firefighters sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as “all pay and benefits lost as a result of Defendant’s failure to properly pay Plaintiffs during temporary assignment of higher-classified duties.” The firefighters also requested prejudgment interest on back pay, attorney’s fees, costs, and postjudgment interest. The City filed a jurisdictional plea asserting governmental immunity, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the firefighters’ claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that such claims did not implicate governmental immunity. Although the court of appeals correctly concluded that immunity does not preclude certain prospective claims, we recently held that such actions must be brought against the relevant government officials, rather than the governmental entity itself. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 (observing that “these suits cannot be brought against the state, which retains immunity, but must be brought against the state actors in their official capacity. This is true even though the suit is, for all practical purposes, against the state.”). Here, the firefighters named the City rather than city officials in their official capacity as Heinrich requires, but their pleading predated Heinrich. In addition to remanding to permit the firefighters to replead in light of chapter 271, our remand will also permit the firefighters to replead in light of Heinrich and seek appropriate relief, if any, against the relevant city officials. Accordingly, we grant the firefighters’ petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, 60.2(d). KEITH LOWELL, ET AL. v. CITY OF BAYTOWN, TEXAS; from Harris County; 1st district (01-04-00548-CV, 264 SW3d 31, 08- 09-07) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion Link to Electronic Briefs in this case 07-1011 LOWELL v. CITY OF BAYTOWN, TEXAS In Re SCI, No. 10-0155 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam opinion)(arbitration, procedure to select arbitrator) This mandamus proceeding arises from an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The parties entered into a contract for interment rights and services. The contract obligated the parties to arbitrate this dispute over the care and maintenance of the cemetery. The arbitration agreement provides that an arbitrator would either be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The parties failed to agree to an arbitrator and the trial court appointed an arbitrator without allowing a reasonable opportunity to procure an appointment by AAA. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We conclude that the contract is not ambiguous on this point. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the contract requires that they use AAA to appoint the arbitrator. IN RE SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL AND SCI TEXAS FUNERAL SERVICES, INC. D/B/A MAGIC VALLEY MEMORIAL GARDENS; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-09-00681-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 02-17-10) stay order issued March 12, 2010, lifted Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion Links to Electronic Briefs in this case 10-0155 IN RE SERVICE CORP. INT'L In re Service Corp. Inc., No. 10-0158 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam opinion) (appointment of arbitrator based on agreement on method, rather than selection by the trial court judge) (mandamus granted) IN RE SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL AND SCI TEXAS FUNERAL SERVICES, INC., JOINTLY D/B/A MONT META MEMORIAL GARDENS; from Cameron County; 13th district (13-10-00026-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 02-23-10) Norma Sandoval and her sister, Nora Martinez, jointly filed suit against Service Corporation International (SCI) alleging fraud, deceptive trade practices, and other tort claims arising from their respective interment rights and services contracts for family burial plots at Mont Meta Memorial Park.1 The parties agree the dispute was required to be arbitrated pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. SCI asserts that the trial court’s appointment of an arbitrator interfered with the contractual rights of the parties and was not authorized by the Federal Arbitration Act. Without reaching the parties’ arguments as to which party or parties have the burden of approaching the AAA to appoint an arbitrator, we agree with SCI that the trial court’s appointment was an abuse of discretion from which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). In a related case also decided today, In re Service Corp. International & SCI Tex. Funeral Services, Inc. d/b/a Magic Valley Memorial Gardens, we analyzed an identical arbitration provision. __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2011). Following the rationale in Magic Valley Memorial Gardens, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by appointing an arbitrator instead of following the agreed-upon method of selection outlined in the contract. As a matter of law, the two month delay in the selection of an arbitrator in this case, by itself, does not establish a lapse or failure of the parties to avail themselves of the contractual selection method. See 9 U.S.C. § 5; Magic Valley Memorial Gardens, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2011). Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant SCI’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its prior order appointing David Calvillo as arbitrator. TEX. R.APP. P. 59.1, 52.8(c). We are confident the trial court will comply, and the writ will issue only if it fails to do so. OPINION DELIVERED: December 16, 2011 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion Link to Electronic Briefs in this case 10-0158 IN RE SERVICE CORP. INT'L Etan Industries, Inc. v. Lehmann, No. 10-0318 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam opinion) (limitations bar, propriety of declaratory relief, award of attorney's fees on declaratory judgment claim, mootness doctrine) Defendant Etan Industries, Inc. contends that the tort claims against it are barred by the two year statute of limitations. It also argues that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. We agree and accordingly reverse and render judgment for Etan. We agree with Etan that the Lehmanns’ common-law tort claims were barred by limitations. Etan argues that the claims for declaratory judgment were moot because Etan had removed its lines from the Lehmanns’ properties prior to trial. We agree. We have recently noted that a request for declaratory judgment is moot if the claim presents “no live controversy.” Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011). ETAN INDUSTRIES, INC. AND ETAN INDUSTRIES, INC., D/B/A CMA CABLEVISION AND/OR CMA COMMUNICATIONS v. RONALD LEHMANN AND DANA LEHMANN; from Lee County; 3rd district (03-07-00539-CV, 308 SW3d 489, 03-26-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Per Curiam Opinion Link to Electronic Briefs in this case incl amicus brief by Texas Cable Association: 10-0318 ETAN INDUSTRIES, INC. v. LEHMANN Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, No. 10-0429 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(Opinion by Lehrmann) (oil, gas and natural resources law, limitations and discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, accrual of cause of action, starting date for running of limitations) This case involves a dispute concerning alleged underpayments of gas royalty. We must decide whether limitations barred a royalty owner’s claims against the operator of the field. We hold that the fraudulent concealment doctrine does not apply to extend limitations as a matter of law when the royalty underpayments could have been discovered from readily accessible and publicly available information before the limitations period expired. When, as in this case, the information was publicly available and readily accessible to the royalty owner during the applicable time period, a royalty owner who fails to take action does not use reasonable diligence as a matter of law. It has long been the law that the discovery rule does not apply to defer the accrual of royalty owners’ claims for underpayments when the injury could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, because the parties do not dispute that the pertinent information was readily accessible and publicly available, the royalty owner’s claims are time-barred as a matter of law. Conclusion We hold that evidence conclusively established that Shell’s alleged fraud could have been discovered by the Rosses through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for Shell. SHELL OIL COMPANY; SWEPI LP D/B/A SHELL WESTERN E&P, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO SHELL WESTERN E&P, INC. v. RALPH ROSS; from Harris County; 1st district (01-08-00713-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 02-25-10) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court. Links to pdf version of opinion and to Electronic Briefs in this case can be found on the Texas Supreme Court's web site Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer, No. 10-0734 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam) (selection of arbitrators on panel, neutrality of chosen arbitrator) This case concerns an arbitration provision that allows each party to appoint one arbitrator to a panel, subject to certain requirements. At issue is whether Americo Life, Inc. waived its objection to the removal of the arbitrator it selected. The underlying dispute concerned the financing mechanism for Americo’s purchase of several insurance companies from Robert Myer.1 Pursuant to the financing agreement, Americo and Myer submitted their dispute to arbitration under American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The arbitrators found in favor of Myer, and Americo filed a The court of appeals is correct that Americo did not expressly state that arbitrators were not required to be neutral. 315 S.W.3d at 75– 76. However, Americo argued that the AAA requirements did not apply, that the only applicable requirements were that they be knowledgeable and independent businesspersons or professionals, and that Figari met these qualifications. Americo properly preserved this argument. Therefore, without hearing oral argument, TEX. R.APP. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AMERICO LIFE, INC., AMERICO FINANCIAL LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, GREAT SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE OHIO STATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, AND NATIONAL FARMERS' UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. ROBERT L. MYER AND STRIDER MARKETING GROUP, INC.; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-08-01053-CV, 315 SW3d 72, 10-22-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion Links to pdf version of opinion and to Electronic Briefs in this case can be found on the Texas Supreme Court's web site In re Jeffrey Cook, No. 10-0855 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam opinion) (reason for grant of new trial required, even if original judge replaced)(mandamus granted). The relator asks us to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion when it issued an order granting a motion for new trial “based on all grounds in the motion.” While this case was pending, however, the judge who signed the order resigned, and we remanded the case pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(b). The successor trial judge then entered an order stating only that his predecessor’s ruling “should remain unchanged.” We recently held that a successor trial court’s order reaffirming the original trial court’s grant of a motion for new trial was “effectively an order refusing to enter judgment on the jury verdict and affects the rights of the parties no less than did the orders of the original judge,” and we concluded that the relator in that case was “entitled to know those reasons just as much as it would be entitled to know the reasons for the orders entered by the former trial judge.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. 2009). Accordingly, we conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the successor trial court to specify the reasons it refused to enter judgment on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. Id. at 215. Because the successor trial court judge in this case did not state sufficient reasons for his ruling, contrary to our holding in In re Columbia, we conditionally grant relief. Without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c), we conditionally grant Jeffrey’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the successor trial court to specify the reasons why it refused to enter judgment on the jury verdict. See In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 215 (requiring reasons to be “clearly identified and reasonably specific”). We are confident that the trial court will comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not. IN RE JEFFREY COOK; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-10-00068-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-08-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion (Justice Lehrmann not sitting) Link to Electronic Briefs in this case: 10-0855 IN RE JEFFREY COOK Ryland Enterprise, Inc. v. Weatherspoon, No. 11-0189 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2011)(per curiam)(appellate procedure, timeliness of appeal, extension of deadline to file notice of appeal) In this case we must decide whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing Ryland Enterprise, Inc.’s appeal as untimely. Because an arguable interpretation of our procedural rules allowed Ryland’s premature, pre-judgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion) to extend the appellate timetable to ninety days, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to that court. On the facts of this case, an arguable interpretation of appellate rules 26.1(a) and 27.2 and civil rules 329b and 306c allowed Ryland’s motion, though filed pre-judgment, to nevertheless extend the appellate timetable to ninety days. Ryland’ s sixty-fifth-day notice of appeal was therefore timely, and the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment without hearing oral argument and remand to that court for consideration of Ryland’s appeal. RYLAND ENTERPRISE, INC. v. VICKIE WEATHERSPOON; from Harris County; 1st district (01-10-00715-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 01-27-11) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion Link to Electronic Briefs in this case: 11-0189 RYLAND ENTERPRISE, INC. v. WEATHERSPOON October 21, 2011 Rolling Plains Groundwater Conservation District v. City of Aspermont, TX, No. 08-0591 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011) (per curiam)(sovereign/governmental immunity as to declaratory judgment claim)(Heinrich progeny) ROLLING PLAINS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. CITY OF ASPERMONT, TEXAS; from Stonewall County; 11th district (11-07-00009-CV, 258 SW3d 231, 05-08-08) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment. Per Curiam Opinion View Electronic Briefs in 08-0591 ROLLING PLAINS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. CITY OF ASPERMONT, TEXAS [including three amicus briefs] TxDOT v. Sefzik, No. 08-0943 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011) (per curiam) (sovereign immunity and declaratory relief) (remand for possible amendment to assert ultra vires claim against official, rather than state agency) TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. ROGER SEFZIK; from Travis County; 13th district (13- 06-00550-CV, 267 SW3d 127, 06-19-08) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion (Justice Johnson not sitting) View Electronic Briefs in 08-0943 TEXAS DEPT. OF TRANSP. v. SEFZIK Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, No. 09-0223 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011) (Opinion by Jefferson) (attorney's fees and DJA, declaratory judgment action, economic loss rule) SHARYLAND WATER SUPPLY CORPORATION v. CITY OF ALTON, CARTER & BURGESS, INC., CRIS EQUIPMENT COMPANY, AND TURNER, COLLIE & BRADEN, INC.; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13- 06-00038-CV, 277 SW3d 132, 02-05-09) The Court affirms in part, reverses and renders in part, and reverses and remands in part the court of appeals' judgment. Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court View Electronic Briefs 09-0223 SHARYLAND WATER SUPPLY CORP. v. CITY OF ALTON (including multiple amicus briefs) Hemyari v. Stephens, No. 10-0389 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011)(per curiam) (bankruptcy stay and foreclosure) KOUROSH HEMYARI AND UNION VALLEY RANCH, L.P. v. GARY BEN STEPHENS, STEPHENS GROUP, L. P., AND STEPHENS GROUP II, L.P.; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-08-01492-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 04- 20-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Per Curiam Opinion View Electronic Briefs in 10-0389 HEMYARI v. STEPHENS Barnes v. Mathis, No. 10-0669 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011) (per curiam)(nuisance and trespass claims, appellate standards) H.E. BARNES v. LEE ROY MATHIS; from Anderson County; 12th district (12-08-00340-CV, 316 SW3d 795, 07-14-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion View Electronic Briefs in 10-0669 BARNES v. MATHIS Marino v. King, No. 10-0854 (Tex. Oct 21, 2011) (per curiam)(summary judgment based on deemed admissions reversed) LYNDA MARINO v. CHARLES KING; from Brazos County; 10th district (10-09-00368-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-01-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion View Electronic Briefs in 10-0854 MARINO v. KING MOTION FOR REHEARING RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED (with corrected opinion substituted) In Re Puig, No. 10-0460 (Tex. Sep. 30, 2011) 10-0460 IN RE ALICE M. PUIG IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS THE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ALICIA PRIETO PUIG, AND CHARLES B. PUIG; from Webb County; 4th district (04-10-00197-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-02-10) corrected opinion issued View Electronic briefing in 10-0460 IN RE ALICE M. PUIG August 26, 2011 G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, No. 10-0145 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(per curiam opinion) G & H TOWING COMPANY, ET AL. v. CORY WAYNE MAGEE, ET AL.; from Harris County; 1st district (01- 07-00572-CV, 312 SW3d 807, 11-30-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Link to e-briefs: G & H TOWING CO. v. MAGEE St. David's Healthcare Partnership, L.P., No. 10-0524 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(per curiam opinion) ST. DAVID'S HEALTHCARE PARTNERSHIP, L.P., LLP D/B/A ST. DAVID'S HOSPITAL AND ST. DAVID'S COMMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION v. GENARO ESPARZA, JR.; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-09- 00734-CV, 315 SW3d 601, 05-13-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Link to e-briefs: ST. DAVID'S HEALTHCARE PARTNERSHIP, L.P. v. ESPARZA Barth v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 10-0659 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(per curiam opinion) JERRY L. BARTH v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-08-00612 CV, ___ SW3d ___, 05-06-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Link to e-briefs: BARTH v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. Austin State Hospital v. Graham, No. 10-0674 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(per curiam opinion) AUSTIN STATE HOSPITAL, DR. VIKAR NUZHATH AND DR. ERIK LINDFORS v. JOEL GRAHAM; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-09-01312-CV, 319 SW3d 905, 08-04-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Link to e-briefs: AUSTIN STATE HOSP. v. GRAHAM July 29, 2011 Severance v. Patterson, No. 09-0387 (Tex. Jul. 29, 2011)(per curiam)(abatement of Open Beaches Act case) While rehearing was pending, Appellant Carol Severance sold the property at issue to the City of Galveston in a Federal Emergency Management Agency buyout program for homes damaged by Hurricane Ike. The determination whether the federal lawsuit is moot must be made by the Fifth Circuit. We abate our consideration on rehearing of the certified questions pending this mootness determination. CAROL SEVERANCE v. JERRY PATTERSON, COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS GENERAL LAND OFFICE; GREG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS; AND KURT SISTRUNK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF GALVESTON, TEXAS The Court abates consideration on rehearing of the certified questions pending the mootness determination of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] (Chief Justice Jefferson not sitting) View Electronic Briefs SEVERANCE v. JERRY PATTERSON, COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS GENERAL LAND OFFICE In Re Guaranty Ins. Services, Inc., No. 10-0364 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(per curiam opinion) (mandamus granted) (practice of law, conflicts of interest involving paralegal working for both sides in suit, disqualification) What happens when a law firm’s efforts to screen a conflict fail, permitting a nonlawyer who worked on one side of a case at one firm to work on the other side of the same case at the opposing firm? Here, the trial court disqualified the second firm, reasoning there was a conclusive presumption that the nonlawyer had shared confidential information, despite evidence he had not. A divided court of appeals denied mandamus relief. 310 S.W.3d 630, 634. Given our prior decisions on the subject—particularly our recent decision in In re Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding), issued four months after the court of appeals’ decision below—we conclude disqualification was not warranted. Further, because the improper disqualification was a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal, mandamus relief is warranted. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (describing when mandamus relief may issue); NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus in context of improper disqualification). We conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its disqualification order. For these reasons, and without hearing oral argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c), we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to disqualify. We are confident the trial court will comply, and the writ will issue only if it does not. CASE DETAILS: IN RE GUARANTY INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-09-00640-CV, 310 SW3d 630, 04-16-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 10-0364 IN RE GUARANTY INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. In Re Alice Puit, No. 10-0460 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(per curiam opinion) (mandamus denied)(dominant and vs. exclusive jurisdiction) In this case, we are asked to grant mandamus relief to correct a district court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction. The plea challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to determine the ownership of a ranch allegedly owned, in part, by an estate undergoing administration in a county court at law. Under our precedent, the issue here is one of dominant, not exclusive, jurisdiction. The proper method for contesting a court’s lack of dominant jurisdiction is the filing of a plea in abatement, not a plea to the jurisdiction as the relators filed here. See Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247–48 (Tex. 1988). Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the relators’ plea to the jurisdiction, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. Conclusion: Because the issue is one of dominant, rather than exclusive, jurisdiction the relators should have filed a plea in abatement. The district court’s denial of the relators’ plea to the jurisdiction, therefore, did not constitute an abuse of discretion depriving the relators of an adequate appellate remedy. See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985). We note that the improper denial of a plea in abatement may, on occasion, warrant mandamus relief. See, e.g., Curtis, 511 S. W.2d at 266–68. Pleas in abatement are incidental rulings, the denial of which ordinarily does not support mandamus relief. See Abor, 695 S.W.2d at 567.2 But when a court issues an “order which actively interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction” by a court possessing dominant jurisdiction, mandamus relief is appropriate. Id.; see Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W. 3d 239, 258 (Tex. 2001) (granting mandamus relief to direct a district court to move a trial setting so that another court that already exercised jurisdiction over different cases involving nearly identical issues, parties, and witnesses could first consider those cases); Curtis, 511 S.W.2d at 266–68 (granting mandamus relief directing a judge to sustain a plea in abatement in a child custody suit where one court attempted to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the children, despite the fact that dominant jurisdiction had previously been established in another court). Because the Webb County district court did not commit a clear abuse of discretion in denying the relators’ plea to the jurisdiction, any further inquiry into the relators’ appellate remedy is unnecessary. Accordingly, the relators’ petition for writ of mandamus is denied. CASE DETAILS: IN RE ALICE M. PUIG IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS THE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ALICIA PRIETO PUIG, AND CHARLES B. PUIG; from Webb County; 4th district (04- 10-00197-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-02-10) stay order issued July 30, 2010, lifted Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. [ not available as of 7/1 - bad link on court's website] June 24, 2011 LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. Palasota, No. 09-0850 (Tex. Jun 24, 2011)(per curiam) LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. D/B/A UNIVERSAL ACADEMY v. JIMMY PALASOTA D/B/A PALASOTA PROPERTY COMPANY; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-08-01039-CV, 293 SW3d 830, 07-28-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] View Electronic Briefs 09-0850 LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. v. PALASOTA Ganim v. Alattar, No. 10-0592 (Tex. Jun 24, 2011)(per curiam) The issue in this case is whether an agreement to acquire real property for the benefit of a partnership was barred by the statute of frauds. The court of appeals held that it was. We disagree. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to that court for further proceedings. JOHN GANIM v. J. FAROUK (FRANK) ALATTAR; from Fort Bend County; 14th district (14-08-00756-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 02- 18-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] See E-Briefs in 10-0592 GANIM v. ALATTAR Kachikwu Illoh MD v. Carroll, No. 10-0748 (Tex. Jan 24, 2011) (per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we decided Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011), which held, among other things, that a tort action “could have been brought under” the Tort Claims Act even if that tort action does not fall within the Act’s limited waiver of immunity. Id. at 375. In light of Franka, we grant Illoh’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1. KACHIKWU ILLOH, M.D. v. DAMITA CARROLL AND KAREN BUTLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES CARROLL; from Harris County; 14th district (14-09-01001-CV, 321 SW3d 711, 08-05-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 10-0748 KACHIKWU ILLOH, M.D. v. CARROLL May 13, 2011 Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, No. 09-0025 (Tex. May 13, 2011)(per curiam) (what is a med-mal claim; scope of statutory definition, characterization of claim) At issue in this appeal is whether a patient’s claim against a hospital for injuries suffered when she slipped and fell on a wet bathroom floor during her post-operative confinement constitutes a health care liability claim (HCLC). We hold that it does. The essence of Ollie’s claim centers on the failure of Harris Methodist to act with a proper degree of care to furnish a dry floor, warn her of the hazards of a wet bathroom floor, or some similar failure to act. See Garland, 156 S.W.3d at 543-44 (explaining that the Court is not bound by the manner in which the plaintiff’s pleadings characterize the claim in determining whether the claim is an HCLC). Ollie’s pleadings show that her action is a safety claim directly related to services meeting her fundamental needs. The claim falls within the statutory definition of an HCLC and she was required to serve an expert report. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(13). Because Ollie was required to, but did not, serve an expert report, the trial court should have dismissed her claim. The court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. Harris Methodist requested its attorney’s fees and costs in the trial court pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351(b)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Ollie’s claims against Harris Methodist and consider the hospital’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. HARRIS METHODIST FORT WORTH v. JO FAWN OLLIE; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-07-00122-CV, 270 SW3d 720, 10-30-08) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] Electronic Briefs N/A April 29, 2011 THE MOTIONS FOR REHEARING OF THE FOLLOWING CAUSES ARE DENIED: Turtle Healthcare Group, L.L.C. v. Linan, No. 09-0613 (Tex. Apr. 29, 2011)(per curiam) (what is a med- mal claim?) We issued an opinion in this case on February 25, 2011. We deny the motion for rehearing filed by respondents, the Linans, withdraw our prior opinion and issue this opinion in its place. At issue in this appeal is whether claims based on the failure of a ventilator can be brought both as claims subject to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) and claims not subject to the TMLA. We hold that under the record presented, they cannot; all the claims are subject to the TMLA and must be dismissed because no expert report was served. TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. YOLANDA HIGUERA LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE NATURAL PARENT OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN AND GERARDO LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN, DECEASED; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-08-00533-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-11-09) The Court withdraws its opinion issued February 25, 2011 and issues a substituted opinion. [pdf] See Electronic Briefs in 09-0613 TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. LINAN April 15, 2011 In Re John Dows 1 and 2, No. 10-0366 (Tex. Apr. 15, 2011)(per curiam)(orig. proc.) (Rule 202 presuit discovery, subpoena to obtain blogger's identity) In this mandamus proceeding we hold that a court may not order pre-suit discovery by agreement of the witness over the objections of other interested parties without making the findings required by Rule 202.4(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court is directed to vacate its order dated January 29, 2010, and to grant relators’ motions to quash. We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, and the writ will issue only if it fails to do so. IN RE JOHN DOES 1 AND 2; from Jefferson County; 9th district (09-10-00189-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 04-29-10) stay order issued June 4, 2010, lifted Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] (Justice Medina not sitting) View Electronic Briefs 10-0366 IN RE JOHN DOES 1 AND 2 April 1, 2011 Ellis v. Schlimmer, No. 10-0243 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2011) (per curiam)(arbitration, interlocutory appeal) In this case, the court of appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration for want of jurisdiction because the movants failed to establish that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply. ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. We reverse and remand to the court of appeals to consider the appeal’s merits. * * * In this case, while Ellis and Pacesetter did not specifically invoke the TAA in their motion to compel arbitration, their counsel specifically referred to it in the hearing on the motion. The burden was on the Schlimmers to show that some Texas state law or statutory requirement would prevent enforcement of the arbitration agreement under the TAA so that the FAA would preempt the Texas act. They did not raise any such defenses, nor did they question the agreement’s existence. Instead, they argued merely that the agreement did not cover the dispute, and that Ellis and Pacesetter had waived the right to arbitration or were estopped from enforcing it. The court of appeals’ decision erroneously placed the burden to establish the absence of any defenses to arbitration on Ellis and Pacesetter. Under these circumstances, its decision is contrary to the strong policy favoring arbitration. Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. 2008). Accordingly, under Rule 59.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to that court to allow it to consider the appeal’s merits. VERONICA ELLIS AND PACESETTER BUILDERS, INC. D/B/A COLDWELL BANKER PACESETTER STEEL REALTORS v. DR. RON AND TANA SCHLIMMER; from Nueces County; 13th district (13-09-00426-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 01-28-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [pdf] View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 10-0243 ELLIS v. DR. RON AND TANA SCHLIMMER February 25, 2011 Opinions Turtle Healthcare Group, LLC v. Linan, No. 09-0613 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(per curiam)(superseded opinion) (see substituted opinion issued May 29, 2011) TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. YOLANDA HIGUERA LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE NATURAL PARENT OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN AND GERARDO LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN, DECEASED; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-08-00533-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-11-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court. Per Curiam Opinion [6-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 09-0613 TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. LINAN Burlington Northern and Santa Railway Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 10-0064 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(per curiam)(insurance coverage dispute, duty to defend, duty to indemnify) In this insurance coverage dispute The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) sought a declaratory judgment that National Union Fire Insurance Company owed duties to defend and indemnify BNSF in a personal injury suit resulting from a collision between one of its trains and an automobile. The trial court granted National Union’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. ___ S.W.3d ___. Because the court of appeals did not consider evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and insurance policy in determining whether National Union owed a duty to indemnify, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings. Assuming, without deciding, that the court of appeals correctly determined that National Union owed no duty to defend, the court nevertheless erred by not considering all the evidence presented by the parties when it determined the question of National Union’s duty to indemnify BNSF. Without hearing oral argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY F/K/A THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA; from El Paso County; 8th district (08-06-00022-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-09-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [6-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 10-0064 THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. NAT. UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PA January 28, 2011 In Interest of CHC, No. 09-0480 (Tex. Jan 28, 2011)(per curiam) When a pro se party seeks to appeal a trial court’s decision and properly files a sufficient and unchallenged affidavit establishing indigency and requesting a free record on appeal, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate that the party be provided the record. Because the affidavit in this case was not timely challenged, we reverse the court of appeals’ dismissal of this appeal and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Because Hawkins established her indigence demonstrating her inability to pay costs on appeal, Hawkins was entitled to proceed with the appeal without costs. The court of appeals erred in dismissing her appeal for Hawkins’ failure to pay the docketing fee and provide a record. Therefore, without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to the court of appeals with instructions to accept Hawkins’ appeal without payment of the filing fee, order the preparation of Hawkins’ record at no cost, and consider the appeal on its merits. IN THE INTEREST OF C.H.C., A CHILD; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-09-00121-CV, ___SW3d ___, 07-28-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [9-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs 09-0480 IN THE INTEREST OF C.H.C., A CHILD Opinions released January 21, 2011 Nealon, MD v. Williams, No. 06-0752 (Tex. Jan 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding that, for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant Nealon’s and Walser’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. WILLIAM H. NEALON, M.D. AND ERIC M. WALSER, M.D. v. HARRY WILLIAMS; from Galveston County; 1st district (01-05- 00553-CV, 199 SW3d 462, 07-13-06) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 06-0752 WILLIAM H. NEALON, M.D. v. WILLIAMS Clark, RN v. Sell, No. 07-0647 (Tex. Jan. 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding among other things that, for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant Clark, Rodriguez and Ortiz’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. EVELYN CLARK, R.N., ROSEANNE RODRIGUEZ, MHS, AND ELIZABETH ORTIZ, MAS v. CYNTHIA SELL, ON BEHALF OF MITCHELL RAY SELL; from Lubbock County; 7th district (07-07-00049-CV, 228 SW3d 873, 06-27-07) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2 page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 07-0647 EVELYN CLARK, R.N. v. SELL Escalante MD v. Rowan, No. 08-0248 (Tex Jan. 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding among other things that, for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant the doctors’ petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. CARMELITA P. ESCALANTE, M.D., E. EDMUND KIM, M.D., EDGARDO RIVERA, M.D., AND FRANKLIN C. WONG, M.D. v. DONITA ROWAN AND JAMES NIESE; from Harris County; 14th district (14-05-00828-CV&14-06-00197-CV, 251 SW3d 720, 01-22-08) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2 page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in No. 08-0248 CARMELITA P. ESCALANTE, M.D. v. ROWAN Terry Leonard, PA v. Glenn, No. 09-0665 (Tex. Jan. 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding among other things that, for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant Leonard’s and Hain’s petition for review and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. TERRY LEONARD, P.A. AND APRIL DAWN HAIN, M.D. v. ANDRE GLENN; from Bexar County; 4th district (04-08-00200-CV, 293 SW3d 669, 05-20-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2 page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 09-0665 TERRY LEONARD, P.A. v. GLENN Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, MD, No. 09-0830 (Tex. Jan. 21, 2011)(per curiam) In the underlying suit, a physician filed three motions to dismiss, each alleging the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the expert report requirements of section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Two of the motions were premised on timeliness objections and one on adequacy. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims by signing an order attached to the motion attacking the report’s adequacy. The court of appeals affirmed, implying a finding that the report was not timely served as required by section 74.351(a). We conclude the court of appeals erred when it implied such a finding because (1) that finding was not necessary to support the judgment, and (2) the trial court implicitly overruled the motions asserting untimely service. We accordingly reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to that court to review the remaining basis for dismissal: the report’s adequacy under section 74.351(l), (r)(6). ULYSSES L. ROSEMOND v. MAHA KHALIFA AL-LAHIQ, M.D.; from Harris County; 14th district (14-08-00550-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 08-04-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [7-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 09-0830 ROSEMOND v. MAHA KHADIFA ALI-LAHIQ, M.D. Romero, MD v. Lieberman, No. 10-0134 (Tex. Jan 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding that, for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant the doctors’ petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. CESAR ROMERO, M.D., ANTHONY CLAXTON, M.D., AND DAVID KORMAN, M.D. v. JACOB LIEBERMAN ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF LARRY LIEBERMAN, DECEASED; from Kaufman County; 5th district (05-08-01636-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-03-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 10-0134 CESAR ROMERO, M.D. v. LIEBERMAN Reedy, RN v. Pompa, No. 10-0306 (Tex. Jan. 21, 2011)(per curiam) While this case has been pending on appeal, we have decided Franka v. Velasquez, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011), holding among other things that, for purposes of section 101.106(f), a tort action is brought “under” the Texas Tort Claims Act, even if the government has not waived its immunity for such actions. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Franka, we grant Reedy’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. Tex. R. App. P. 59.1. WILMA REEDY, R.N. v. ELIZABETH POMPA AND NICHOLAS POMPA, III, AS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF ANNICA POMPA, A MINOR; from De Witt County; 13th district (13-08-00590-CV, 310 SW3d 112, 03-18-10) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that court. Per Curiam Opinion [2-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in No. 10-0306 WILMA REEDY, R.N. v. POMPA January 14, 2011 Pearson v. Fillingim, No. 10-0013 (Tex. Jan 14, 2011)(per curiam)(divorce property division dispute) In this dispute over the division of property in a divorce decree, we must decide whether the trial court impermissibly reclassified an asset originally divided in a 1981 divorce decree. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that it did. RITA LACKEY FILLINGIM PEARSON v. WILLIS DAN FILLINGIM; from Hemphill County; 7th district (07-08-00144-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03-24-09) Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment. Per Curiam Opinion [6-page opinion in pdf] View Electronic Briefs in 10-0013 PEARSON v. FILLINGIM |