Texas Supreme Court Opinions (Tex. 2011) | Guzman, Eva (2009 Republican Appointee to unexpired term)

Justice Eva M. Guzman

Texas Supreme Court Justice Eva M. Guzman

Justice Guzman was appointed in Oct. 2009 to fill the seat vacated by former Justice Scott
Brister, who resigned prior to expiration of his term of office and returned to private practice.
Guzman, a Republican, faced the state-wide electorate in 2010 and won voter approval.
Justice Guzman previously served as a member on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston.
See Recent Opinions Authored by Justice Guzman as a Judge of the Court of Appeals

Opinions Written by Texas Supreme Court Justice Eva Guzman

LTTS Charter School, Inc. v. C2 Construction Inc., No. 09-0794 (Tex. Jun. 17, 2011)(Willett)(charter school
a governmental unit for tort claims purposes)(interlocutory appeal of immunity ruling permitted).
Because Universal Academy is a “governmental unit” under the Tort Claims Act, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear
Universal Academy’s interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(a)(8).76 Our holding does not resolve the underlying issue
of whether Universal Academy enjoys immunity from C2’s contract claim. We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment
dismissing the appeal and remand to that court for further proceedings.
LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. D/B/A UNIVERSAL ACADEMY v. C2 CONSTRUCTION, INC.; from Dallas County; 5th district
(05-07-01469-CV, 288 SW3d 31, 02-02-09) The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to
that court.
Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice
Johnson, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Guzman delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice
Medina joined. [pdf]
A party’s ability to take an interlocutory appeal is a limited exception to the general rule that only final
orders are appealable. As applicable here, the contours of that exception are found in sections 51.014(a)
(8) and 101.001(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Despite these limits, the Court embarks on a
perilous expedition through the Education Code in an attempt to locate some indicia that the Legislature
intended to allow privately run, open-enrollment charter schools to take this circumscribed form of appeal.
In so doing, the Court ventures beyond the narrow procedural question presented in this case: whether a
privately run, open-enrollment charter school is a “governmental unit” as defined by section 101.001(3) of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. If it is, then an interlocutory appeal is proper from denial of a plea to
the jurisdiction by the school, as authorized by section 51.014(a)(8). But, because it is not, I would affirm
the court of appeals. Privately run, open-enrollment charter schools do not meet the Legislature’s
definition as set out in section 101.001(3), and therefore no interlocutory appeal may be taken from an
order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by such a school.
Conclusion. Because (1) the plain meaning of Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001(3) does
not cover a privately run, open-enrollment charter school like LTTS, and (2) the Court has effectively
resolved the underlying substance of whether such schools enjoy immunity from suit, rather than the
procedural issue properly before us, I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the court of appeals’ holding
that it lacked jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.
See E-briefs in 09-0794 LTTS CHARTER SCHOOL, INC. v. C2 CONSTRUCTION, INC.

In re Reece, No. 09-0520 (Tex. May 27, 2011)(Guzman)
It is well-rooted in our jurisprudence that contempt is a broad and inherent power of a court. But, we have also recognized
that despite the breadth and necessity of that power, it is a power that must be exercised with caution. Today, we decide as
a matter of first impression whether a trial court may hold a litigant in contempt for perjury committed during a deposition.
We are further presented with a question arising from the bifurcated nature of the Texas judiciary and our limited habeas
jurisdiction: whether we should exercise our mandamus jurisdiction to provide a forum for a civil litigant who is deprived of
liberty pursuant to a court’s contempt order, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to exercise its habeas
jurisdiction.
     In the underlying civil case, the relator was held in contempt and confined for perjuring himself during a deposition. The
relator challenged his confinement by seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court
declined to exercise its jurisdiction citing, among other things, the civil nature of the case. The Court of Criminal Appeals
directed the relator to pursue his remedies in this Court. Because we lack habeas jurisdiction in this case, the relator
pursued relief by filing the instant petition for writ of mandamus to challenge his confinement.
     We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by holding the relator in contempt for perjury occurring during a
deposition, because such perjury did not obstruct the operation of the court. Further, because the underlying suit is civil in
nature, and the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant the relator leave to file a habeas petition in that court, we hold
the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and therefore mandamus is the appropriate remedy to correct the trial court’s
abuse of discretion. We conditionally grant relief.
IN RE COY REECE; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-09-00609-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-11-09)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied
motion to revoke bond denied
The Court conditionally grants the writ of mandamus.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Medina, Justice Green, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion. [pdf]
The Court of Criminal Appeals has general original habeas jurisdiction, Tex. Const. art. V, § 5; Ex parte Thompson, 273 S.W.
3d 177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), while this Court’s habeas jurisdiction is limited. Our habeas jurisdiction exists in
matters where a contemnor is confined because he or she violated “an order, judgment, or decree previously made,
rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(e).
Although our habeas jurisdiction is limited, our mandamus jurisdiction is broad. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a); Tex. Gov’t
Code § 22.002(a). And for the reasons the Court sets out, I agree that our broad mandamus jurisdiction encompasses the
matters set out in Reece’s petition. Nevertheless, and as SB International, Inc. argues, Reece substantively petitions this
Court for habeas relief. Under the circumstances I would refrain from granting mandamus relief for the reasons Justice
Willett sets out in part IV of his dissent, which I join. Because I disagree that we should grant mandamus relief, I respectfully
dissent.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Johnson joined as to Part IV. [pdf]
Today’s case [sparks] a game of jurisdictional hot potato between us and our constitutional twin, the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Truth be told—and this particular truth has been told repeatedly—the State’s entire Rube Goldberg-designed
judicial “system” is beyond piecemeal repair; it should be scrapped and rebuilt top-to-bottom. That said, and however
labyrinthine the jurisdictional maze often is, the answer in today’s case seems straightforward: This dispute belongs with
our sister court. It arrived on our doorstep because of a simple yet pivotal misunderstanding: the Court of Criminal Appeals’
mistaken belief that we have unfettered habeas jurisdiction and are thus equally able to grant habeas relief.1 We do not,2
and the Court today is unified 9-0 on that point (though the Court does not explicitly mention our sister court’s
misinterpretation). We part ways 7-2 on whether we should make lemons out of jurisdictional lemonade by wiring around
our habeas limitation and relabeling the relief sought “mandamus.”
The mandamus remedy turns on two findings: legality and practicality.3 On both scores, I would return this case to the court
that conceded two years ago that it “does have the authority to act in this case.”4 Statute and precedent strongly suggest we
cannot hear this case, but even if we can, practical considerations advise we should not. Neither refusing nor resisting, the
Court today yanks tighter a Gordian knot that should be cut clean through. I respectfully dissent, and, for good measure,
exhort the Legislature to propose a judiciary worthy of Texas.
See Electronic Briefs in 09-0520 IN RE COY REECE

City of Houston v. Williams, No. 09-0770 (Tex. Mar 18, 2011) (Guzman)
THE CITY OF HOUSTON v. STEVE WILLIAMS, ET AL.; from Harris County; 14th district (14-08-00059-CV,
290 SW3d 260, 03-31-09)
2 petitions
The Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the
trial court.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
View Electronic Briefs 09-0770 THE CITY OF HOUSTON v. WILLIAMS

RR Comm'n v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water, No. 08-0497 (Tex. Mar. 11,
2011)(Guzman)
The Texas Water Code requires the Railroad Commission of Texas to weigh the “public interest” in the permitting of
proposed oil and gas waste injection wells. In a ruling, the Commission declined to consider traffic-safety factors in its
public interest inquiry. We determine whether the Commission’s interpretation of “public interest” is entitled to judicial
deference. Because we conclude the Commission’s construction of the phrase was reasonable and in accord with the
plain language of the statute, we hold the court of appeals erred in not deferring to the Commission’s interpretation. We
therefore reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for the petitioners in accordance with the trial court’s
original judgment.
The court of appeals failed to grant deference to the Commission’s interpretation of “public interest” in section 27.051(b)(1)
of the Water Code and instead held the Commission abused its discretion in its construction of the statute. Because we
conclude the Commission’s interpretation of the phrase “public interest” is reasonable and in accord with the plain
meaning of the statute, we hold the court of appeals erred in refusing to defer to the Commission’s construction of the term.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for the Commission and Pioneer in
accordance with the trial court’s original judgment.
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS AND PIONEER EXPLORATION, LTD. v. TEXAS CITIZENS FOR A
SAFE FUTURE AND CLEAN WATER AND JAMES G. POPP; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-07-00025-
CV, 254 SW3d 492, 12-06-07)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice
Medina, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined. [pdf]
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Willett and Justice
Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
View Electronic Briefs 08-0497
RAILROAD COMM'N OF TX v. TX CITIZENS FOR A SAFE FUTURE AND CLEAN WATER

Samlowski MD v. Wooten, Carol, No. 08-0667 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(Medina)
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351 requires that a trial court dismiss a health care liability claim
unless the claimant serves an expert report within 120 days after filing suit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(b). This
dismissal requirement is subject to the trial court’s discretion to grant one thirty-day extension for the claimant to cure a
timely served but deficient report. Id. § 74.351(c). The trial court in this health care liability case determined that claimant’s
timely served report was deficient and dismissed her suit without granting her request for an extension of time to cure the
report. The court of appeals agreed the report was deficient but concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying
the requested extension. 282 S.W.3d 82, 91.
We granted the petition to consider under what circumstances a trial court might abuse its discretion when denying such an
extension. Like most cases involving trial court discretion, a single rule will not fit every situation, but generally a trial court
should grant an extension when the deficient report can be cured within the thirty-day period the statute permits. The court of
appeals concluded, among other things, that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, and a
majority of the Court agrees with that judgment. There is no majority reasoning for why we remand, however. Three
members of the Court essentially agree with the court of appeals’ analysis, three members disagree with that analysis and
would reverse and render, and three members disagree with the court of appeals’ analysis but would nevertheless remand
in the interests of justice. I am in this last group.
Because the record does not establish that the deficient expert report would have been cured if the extension had been
granted in this case, I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the extension. Although I disagree with
the court of appeals’ analysis of the statute and its application of the abuse of discretion standard, I conclude that the
interests of justice require a remand to the trial court in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment
remanding this cause as modified by this opinion.
EBERHARD SAMLOWSKI, M.D. v. CAROL WOOTEN; from Johnson County; 10th district (10-07-00305-
CV, 282 SW3d 82, 05-21-08)
The Court modifies the court of appeals' judgment and affirms that judgment as modified.
Justice Medina announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Chief Justice
Jefferson and Justice Hecht joined. [12-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Guzman filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Lehrmann joined
and in which Justice Wainwright joined Parts I & II.B. [8-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Wainwright delivered an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment. [6-page opinion
in pdf]
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green and Justice Willett joined. [12-page
opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 08-0667 EBERHARD SAMLOWSKI, M.D. v. WOOTEN

Presidio ISD v. Scott (pdf), No. 08-0958 (Tex. Apr. 23 , 2010)(Guzman)(education law, teacher
disciplinary administrative appeals)
PRESIDIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. ROBERT SCOTT, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION;
from Travis County;
3rd district (03-07-00319-CV, 266 SW3d 531, 08-28-08)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf]
See Electronic Briefs in PRESIDIO ISD v. ROBERT SCOTT, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

Kelly v. General Interior Construction, Inc., No. 08-0669 (Tex. Jan. 22, 2010)(Guzman)(no
personal jurisdiction, out-of-state officers of construction company should have been granted special
appearance, no minimum contacts shown)
DAN KELLY AND LAURA HOFSTATTER v. GENERAL INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION, INC.; from Harris
County; 14th district (14-07-00270-CV, 262 SW3d 79, 07-03-08)
The Court reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court.

Recently Decided Cases from the 14th Court of Appeals in Which Justice
Guzman Did Not Participate

Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., No. 06-0714 (Tex. Oct. 22, 2010)(Hecht)(asbestos liability,
retroactive deprivation of right to sue for negligence, unconstitutional, derivative wrongful death survival
action by wife)
BARBARA ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN
ROBINSON, DECEASED v. CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR
TO MUNDET CORK CORPORATION; from Harris County; 14th district (14-04-00658-CV, 251 SW3d 520,
05-04-06)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Medina, Justice
Green, Justice Willett, and Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Medina delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Wainwright delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Johnson joined. [pdf]
(Justice Guzman not sitting)
View Electronic Briefs in No. 06-0714 ROBINSON v. CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC.

Galveston ISD v. Jaco, No. 09-0195 (Tex. Feb. 12, 2010)(per curiam)
(WBA case remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether plaintiff has alleged a violation under
the Texas Whistleblower Act under the court's new precedent in Lueck, which jurisdictionalized the
sufficiency of the facts pleaded in support of each element of the claim)
GALVESTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BRENT JACO; from Galveston County;
14th district (14-08-00271-CV, 278 SW3d 477, 01-20-09)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to that
court. Per Curiam Opinion
(Justice Guzman not sitting) [she wrote the opinion in the court below]

D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Markel International Ins. Co.
No. 06-1018 (Tex. Dec. 11, 2009)(Wainwright)(CGL insurance coverage, duty to defend, duty to indemnify)
D.R. HORTON-TEXAS, LTD. v. MARKEL INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; from Harris
County; 14th district (14-05-00486-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10-26-06)
The Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the
trial court.
Justice Dale Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court [in pdf] (Justice Guzman not sitting)

On the Supreme Court's current docket are a number of cases in which Justice Guzman
wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals.

See related post

Currently pending cases involving new Justice Eva Guzman

(Don Cruse Blog)

Supreme Court reverses opinion by

former 14th Court of Appeals

Justice Eva Guzman in

whistleblower case

(JCB)

The list of Guzman's cases includes an important case on official immunity of government employees in
which her own court, was deeply divided. Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5, 23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, pet. filed and case docketed under No. 09-0009).
On rehearing en banc, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals disagreed with the panel on availability of official
immunity defense to a firefighter who had caused a collision with another vehicle and severe personal
injuries to its occupants. Guzman dissented from the panel's majority opinion and wrote the majority for the
court as a whole that reversed the panel.
Green v. Alford (pdf) (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 2008)(Opinion on en banc rehearing by
Guzman) (affirmative defense of official immunity in fire truck collision properly rejected)
("We grant Ronald and Dwainia Alford's motions for rehearing en banc, withdraw our opinion and judgment of March 27,
2007, and issue the following majority opinion on en banc rehearing and accompanying judgment in its place.
This case arises from a traffic accident in which a fire truck collided with another vehicle, causing Ronald Alford to sustain a
broken neck and causing permanent neurological damage to his nine-year-old son, Aaron. The trial court found that
Christopher Green, the firefighter driving the truck, acted recklessly and was not entitled to official immunity or limitation of
liability. Green asks us to reverse the judgment against him, arguing that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence
that he acted recklessly and that his actions were not performed in good faith. In the alternative, he raises a matter of first
impression, arguing that damages are statutorily limited to $100,000 because he is insured by a policy purchased by the
City of Pasadena, despite the fact that coverage is subject to a $100,000 self-insured retention. We conclude that (a) Green
failed to establish he was acting in good faith at the time of the accident, (b) legally and factually sufficient evidence
supports the trial court's finding that Green acted recklessly, and (c) the damage cap set forth in section 108.002 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code does not apply to these facts. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.")
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Eva Guzman
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Brock Yates, Anderson, Hudson, Fowler, Frost, Seymore, Guzman,
Brown and Boyce
14-05-00407-CV   Christopher Green v. Dwainia Alford, Individually and as Next Friend of Aaron Alford and
Ronald Alford
Appeal from 152nd District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Kenneth Price Wise
Concurring Opinion by Justice Frost
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Hudson