TEX. CASE LAW ---> Health Care Liability (HCLC aka MED-MAL cases)

law-HCLC | health care liability claims | appeals in medical malpractice suits | attorney's fees as sanctions in HCLC

A health care liability claimant must serve on each “party or party’s attorney” one or more expert reports no
later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
74.351(a) (West 2011). By statute, if an expert report is not served within the specified time period, the
court must enter an order that dismisses the claim with respect to the health care provider, with prejudice
to refiling of the claim, and that awards to the affected health care provider reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs of court. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).
“The date for serving the report may be extended by written agreement of the affected parties.” Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a). No such agreement appears here.

RECENT HEALTH CARE LIABILITY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)
CASES DECIDED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT

St. David's Healthcare Partnership, L.P. v. Esparza, No. 10-0524 (Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)(per curiam
opinion) (slip and fall as med-mal claim)
In this case, we decide whether a patient's claim against a hospital for injuries suffered when he slipped and fell on
a lubricating gel that fell to the floor of his hospital room during or immediately after a bladder scan is a health care
liability claim. We hold that it is. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the
trial court with instructions to dismiss Esparza's claims and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We hold that the alleged negligence in permitting the gel to fall and remain on the floor of Esparza's room, causing
his fall, is inseparable from the procedures for the disposition of gloves in a hospital. Esparza's claims are properly
classified as health care liability claims because they arose from a departure from accepted standards "that should
have been performed or furnished" by St. David's during Esparza's "medical care, treatment, or confinement." Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(10),(13). The trial court should have dismissed Esparza's claim for failure to
comply with the expert report requirements of the TMLA, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. We
grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and
remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Esparza's claims and for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, 60.2(d).
ST. DAVID'S HEALTHCARE PARTNERSHIP, L.P., LLP D/B/A ST. DAVID'S HOSPITAL AND ST. DAVID'S
COMMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION v. GENARO ESPARZA, JR.; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-09-00734-CV,
315 SW3d 601, 05-13-10)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral
argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Per Curiam Opinion [pdf]
Link to e-briefs: ST. DAVID'S HEALTHCARE PARTNERSHIP, L.P. v. ESPARZA

Omaha Healthcare Center, LLC v. Johnson (Tex. 2011),
No. 08-0231 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Justice Phil Johnson)(HCLC, med-mal suit, characterization of claim,
expert report requirement, spider bite as medical malpractice)
In this case we consider whether claims against a nursing home regarding a patient’s death alleged to have been
caused by a brown recluse spider bite are health care liability claims (HCLCs) that required an expert report to be
served. The trial court and court of appeals held that they were not. We disagree.
Conclusion. Johnson’s claim is an HCLC and should have been dismissed. Because Omaha requested its attorney’
s fees and costs in the trial court pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351(b)(1), the case
must be remanded. We grant Omaha’s petition for review. Without hearing oral argument we reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Johnson’s claims and consider
Omaha’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.
CASE DETAILS: OMAHA HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC v. WILMA JOHNSON, ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF CLASSIE MAE REED,
DECEASED; from Morris County; 6th district (06-07-00089-CV, 246 SW3d 278, 02-08-08)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court
reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Phil Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Justice
Dale Wainwright, Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Don R. Willett, and Justice Eva M. Guzman joined. [pdf]
Justice Debra Lehrmann delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice David Medina joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 08-0231 OMAHA HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC v. JOHNSON

Tyler Scoresby, MD v. Santillan (Tex. 2011),
No. 09-0497(Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Justice Don R. Willett)(HCLC med-mal suits, expert report deadline
extension, curing of defective reports, when is immediate appellate review available?)
The Medical Liability Act entitles a defendant to dismissal of a health care liability claim if, within 120 days of the
date suit was filed, he is not served with an expert report showing that the claim against him has merit. The trial
court’s refusal to dismiss is immediately appealable. The Act sets specific requirements for an adequate report and
mandates that “an objective good faith effort [be made] to comply” with them, but it also authorizes the trial court to
give a plaintiff who meets the 120-day deadline an additional thirty days in which to cure a “deficiency” in the
elements of the report. The trial court should err on the side of granting the additional time and must grant it if the
deficiencies are curable. The defendant cannot seek review of this ruling or appeal the court’s concomitant refusal
to dismiss the claim before the thirty-day period has expired.
Conclusion. We conclude that a thirty-day extension to cure deficiencies in an expert report may be granted if the
report is served by the statutory deadline, if it contains the opinion of an individual with expertise that the claim has
merit, and if the defendant’s conduct is implicated. We recognize that this is a minimal standard, but we think it is
necessary if multiple interlocutory appeals are to be avoided, and appropriate to give a claimant the
opportunity provided by the Act’s thirty-day extension to show that a claim has merit. All deficiencies, whether in
the expert’s opinions or qualifications, are subject to being cured before an appeal may be taken from the trial
court’s refusal to dismiss the case.
CASE DETAILS: TYLER SCORESBY, M.D. v. CATARINO SANTILLAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SAMUEL SANTILLAN,
A MINOR; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-08-00357-CV, 287 SW3d 319, 04-30-09) 2 petitions
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Nathan L. Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice David Medina, Justice
Paul W. Green, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva M. Guzman, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Don R. Willett delivered a concurring opinion. [pdf]
Justice Phil Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 09-0497 TYLER SCORESBY, M.D. v. SANTILLAN

Carreras, MD v. Marroquin (Tex. 2011),
No. 09-0857 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2011) (Wainwright)(HCLC, presuit notice, no tolling)
In this dispute, parents brought wrongful death claims against a physician who allegedly caused their adult child’s death. The parents
attempted to toll the statute of limitations by sending pre-suit notice of their health care liability claims to the physician shortly before
the statute of limitations ran, but failed to accompany it with an authorization form for the release of their daughter’s medical
information as required by Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. After the parents filed suit, the doctor moved
for summary judgment, arguing that the notice alone did not toll the statute of limitations, and the suit therefore was untimely. The trial
court denied the motion and entered an agreed order permitting appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(d). The court of
appeals affirmed the denial. 297 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2009, pet. granted). Because we hold that
Chapter 74 requires that an authorization form accompany the provision of notice for the statute of limitations to be tolled, we reverse
and render.
Accordingly, considering the text, history, and purpose of the statutes at issue, we conclude that for the statute of limitations to be
tolled in a health care liability claim pursuant to Chapter 74, a plaintiff must provide both the statutorily required notice and the
statutorily required authorization form. The Marroquins did not provide the statutorily required authorization form until after the statute
of limitations expired, their claims were untimely, and the court of appeals erred in holding that Chapter 74 does not bar tolling of
limitations when a plaintiff provides the required pre-suit notice without also providing the required medical authorization form.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that the Marroquins take nothing.
JOSE CARRERAS, M.D., P.A. v. CARLOS FRANCISCO MARROQUIN, ET AL.; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-09-00156-CV, 297
SW3d 420, 08-25-09)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court. [10-page opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 09-0857 JOSE CARRERAS, M.D., P.A. v. MARROQUIN

Samlowski MD v. Wooten, Carol (Tex. 2011),
No. 08-0667 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(Medina) (HCLC deadline extension for expert report)
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351 requires that a trial court dismiss a health care liability claim unless the
claimant serves an expert report within 120 days after filing suit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(b). This dismissal requirement
is subject to the trial court’s discretion to grant one thirty-day extension for the claimant to cure a timely served but deficient report. Id. §
74.351(c). The trial court in this health care liability case determined that claimant’s timely served report was deficient and dismissed
her suit without granting her request for an extension of time to cure the report. The court of appeals agreed the report was deficient
but concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the requested extension. 282 S.W.3d 82, 91.
We granted the petition to consider under what circumstances a trial court might abuse its discretion when denying such an
extension. Like most cases involving trial court discretion, a single rule will not fit every situation, but generally a trial court should
grant an extension when the deficient report can be cured within the thirty-day period the statute permits. The court of appeals
concluded, among other things, that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, and a majority of the Court
agrees with that judgment. There is no majority reasoning for why we remand, however. Three members of the Court essentially
agree with the court of appeals’ analysis, three members disagree with that analysis and would reverse and render, and three
members disagree with the court of appeals’ analysis but would nevertheless remand in the interests of justice. I am in this last
group.
EBERHARD SAMLOWSKI, M.D. v. CAROL WOOTEN; from Johnson County; 10th district (10-07-00305-CV, 282 SW3d 82, 05-21-08)
The Court modifies the court of appeals' judgment and affirms that judgment as modified.
Justice Medina announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Hecht
joined. [12-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Guzman filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Lehrmann joined and in which Justice Wainwright
joined Parts I & II.B. [8-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Wainwright delivered an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment. [6-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green and Justice Willett joined. [12-page opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 08-0667 EBERHARD SAMLOWSKI, M.D. v. WOOTEN

Stockton v. Offenbach, MD (Tex. 2011),
No. 09-0446 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(Medina)(HCLC, no extension of expert report filing deadline based on inability to
promptly serve Defendant in person)
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351 requires that an expert report be served on each physician or health care
provider against whom a health care liability claim is asserted. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a). The statute further directs the
trial court to dismiss the health care liability claim if this report is not served within 120 days of the suit’s filing. Id. § 74.351(a), (b). In
this appeal, the claimant argues that she was not able to serve the expert report within 120 days because the defendant physician
could not be found. She further contends that she diligently searched for the physician and that a due diligence exception should
apply to extend the statutory deadline or, alternatively, that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to her because it was impossible
for her to comply with its deadline. The court of appeals concluded that the statute did not provide for an exception to its deadline
under these circumstances and was not unconstitutional as applied to her. 285 S.W.3d 517. We agree and affirm.
DEBBIE STOCKTON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF WILLIAM STOCKTON, A MINOR v. HOWARD A. OFFENBACH, M.D.; from
Dallas County; 5th district (05-08-01185-CV, 285 SW3d 517, 03-11-09)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court. [15-page opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in 09-0446 STOCKTON v. HOWARD A. OFFENBACH, M.D.

Turtle Healthcare Group, LLC v. Linan (Tex. 2011),
No. 09-0613 (Tex. Feb. 25, 2011)(per curiam) (HCLC, characterization of claim)
At issue in this appeal is whether claims based on the failure of a ventilator can be brought both as claims subject to the Texas
Medical Liability Act (TMLA) and claims not subject to the TMLA. We hold that under the record presented, they cannot; all the claims
are subject to the TMLA and must be dismissed because no expert report was served.
TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. YOLANDA HIGUERA LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
NATURAL PARENT OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN AND GERARDO LINAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
ESTATE OF MARIA YOLANDA LINAN, DECEASED; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-08-00533-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-11-09)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court
affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Per Curiam Opinion [6-page opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in Case No. 09-0613
TURTLE HEALTHCARE GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A FRED'S PHARMACY v. LINAN

Franka MD v. Velasquez (Tex. 2011),
No. 07-0131 (Tex. Jan 21, 2011)(Hecht)(TTCA, HCLC, government employee vs governmental entity)
Section 101.106(f) of the Texas Tort Claims Act provides that a suit against a government employee acting within the general scope of
his employment must be dismissed “if it could have been brought under this chapter [that is, under the Act] against the governmental
unit”.1 The court of appeals construed the quoted clause to mean that, to be entitled to dismissal, the employee must establish that
governmental immunity from suit has been waived by the Act.2 But as we stated in Mission Consolidated Independent School District
v. Garcia: “we have never interpreted ‘under this chapter’ to only encompass tort claims for which the Tort Claims Act waives
immunity.”3 Rather, “all [common-law] tort theories alleged against a governmental unit . . . are assumed to be ‘under [the Tort
Claims Act]’ for purposes of section 101.106.”4 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
[...] we hold that for section 101.106(f), suit “could have been brought” under the Act against the government regardless of whether the
Act waives immunity from suit. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
JOHN CHRISTOPHER FRANKA, M.D. AND NAGAKRISHNA REDDY, M.D. v. STACEY VELASQUEZ AND SARAGOSA ALANIZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIENDS OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, SARAGOSA MARIO ALANIZ; from Bexar County; 4th district (04-06-
00190-CV, 216 SW3d 409, 09-06-06)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case to the trial court.
Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green, Justice Johnson,
and Justice Willett joined. [28 page opinion in pdf]
Justice Medina delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann joined. [21-page opinion in pdf]
(Justice Guzman not sitting)
View Electronic Briefs 07-0131 FRANKA, M.D. and NAGAKRISHNA REDDY, M.D. v. VELASQUEZ

Molinet v. Kimbrell, MD (Tex. 2011),
No. 09-0544 (Tex. Jan. 21, 2011)(Johnson)(HCLC limitations, SoL, responsible 3rd parties)
In this case we consider a statutory conflict regarding whether limitations bars Jeremy Molinet’s health care liability claims against
two doctors he sued after they had been designated as responsible third parties pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code section 33.004. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004.1 Molinet joined the doctors as defendants within sixty days after they
were designated as responsible third parties but more than two years after they last treated him. Section 33.004(e) provides that if a
defendant designates a responsible third party the claimant may, within sixty days, join the designated party “even though such
joinder would otherwise be barred by limitations.” Id. However, section 74.251(a) provides a two-year limitations period for health care
liability claims that applies “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” and section 74.002(a) provides that chapter 74 controls in the event its
provisions conflict with other law. See id. §§ 74.251(a), 74.002(a).
We hold that section 74.251(a) prevails and Molinet’s claims against the doctors are barred by its two-year limitations period. [...] The
court of appeals correctly concluded that section 74.251(a) bars Molinet’s suit against Drs. Horan and Kimbrell. Accordingly, we affirm
the court of appeals’ judgment.
JEREMY MOLINET v. PATRICK KIMBRELL, M.D. AND JOHN HORAN, M.D.; from Bexar County; 4th district (04-08-00379-CV, 288
SW3d 464, 12-31-08)
The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice Wainwright, Justice Green,
Justice Willett, and Justice Guzman joined. [16-page opinion in pdf]
Justice Lehrmann delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Medina joined. [9 page opinion in pdf]
View Electronic Briefs in 09-0544 MOLINET v. PATRICK KIMBRELL, M.D

Also see separate page on Texas Supreme Court opinions in appeals of medical malpractice suits

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT IN HCLC
APPEALS (not an exhaustive list)

09-0058 JOSEPH DANIELS, D.O., JOSEPH DANIELS, D.O., P.A. AND AMERICAN ORTHOPEDIC NEUROLOGICAL AND
REHABILITATION CENTER v. SHARON JORDAN, AS NEXT FRIEND OF MICHAEL MASHBURN AND MICHAEL MASHBURN,
INDIVIDUALLY; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02 -06 -00341 -CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11‑13‑08)(medical malpractice claims, summary
judgment based on limitations reversed)
Appellants Sharon Jordan, as Next friend of Michael Mashburn (Jordan), and Michael Mashburn, individually (Mashburn) (sometimes
collectively, Mashburn), appeal from a summary judgment rendered for appellees Joseph Daniels, D.O., Joseph Daniels, D.O., P.A.,
and American Orthopedic Neurological Rehabilitation Center (collectively, Dr. Daniels) on Mashburn's medical malpractice claims. In
three issues, Mashburn complains that the trial court improperly (1) granted Dr. Daniels's motion for summary judgment, (2) denied
Mashburn's motion for new trial, and (3) sustained various objections to Mashburn's summary judgment evidence. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.Since these claims accrued during the limitations period, and because limitations was Dr. Daniels's
only basis for summary judgment, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to these claims.[21] Accordingly, we sustain
Mashburn's first issue in part.

08‑0860
EFRAIN RIVERA, M.D. v. ANITA LOWEREE; from El Paso County; 8th district (08 -06 -00185 -CV, 281 SW3d 515, 08‑28‑08) (HCLC)
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Efrain Rivera, M.D. appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the health care liability suit
brought by Appellee/Cross-Appellant Anita Loweree. (1) Specifically, Dr. Rivera argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the motion because Ms. Loweree did not serve upon him or his attorney a Tex.Civ.Prac.& Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351 expert report with
curriculum vitae within 120 days of filing the claim in the underlying suit. By cross-appeal, Ms. Loweree challenges the same order,
arguing the trial court erred in failing to deny Dr. Rivera's motion based on waiver. We find we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory
appeal and affirm the trial court's order.

09‑0077
JOHN M. LIM, M.D. v. RALPH WEST; from Harris County; 1st district (01-08-00469-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10‑23‑08)( interlocutory appeal
health care liability case, abatement)

08‑0458
JASON MARIS v. TADD HENDRICKS, AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MELISSA HENDRICKS, DECEASED,
TADD HENDRICKS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF JOSHUA AND DANIEL HENDRICKS, MINORS, AND CHARLIE
MORELLO; from Denton County; 2nd district (02‑07‑00300‑CV, ___ SW3d ___, 05‑01‑08, pet denied Oct. 2008)(order denying his
motion to dismiss the health care liability claims)

08-0602
NANCY ORTEGON v. ENRIQUE BENAVIDES, M.D.; from Webb County; 4th district
(04‑05‑00768‑CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03‑05‑08) (medical malpractice, res ipsa loquitur, sponge left in body after surgery)

08-0539
CECELIA LEDESMA v. BRUCE JOHNS, CRNA; from Williamson County; 3rd district
(03-05-00454-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 08-03-07, pet. denied Aug. 2008)(HCLC, deficient expert report, constitutional challenge denied)
Cecelia Ledesma appeals the district court's dismissal of her health care liability claim against Certified Registered Nurse
Anesthetist, Bruce Johns, for failure to make an objective, good faith effort to timely serve an expert report that complies with the
requirements in section 74.351 of the civil practices and remedies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 (West Supp.
2006). Ledesma argues that the district court erred in holding that the expert reports that she had served failed to comply with section
74.351 and by not allowing her a 30-day time extension to cure any deficiencies. Ledesma also asserts that chapter 74 of the civil
practice and remedies code is unconstitutional. We affirm the district court's judgment.

07-1063
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, EDMUND SANCHEZ, M.D., AND SRINATH CHINNAKOTLA, M.D. v. HAROLD BIGGS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF CHERI JEAN WELLS BIGGS, DECEASED, BRANDON WELLS, AND CHER
BIGGS; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-06-01104-CV, 237 SW3d 909, 11-09-07) (HCLC, sufficiency of expert report, CoA
remanded to TC to determine whether extension should be granted to file proper report)

08-0819 PEDRO P. HANI, M.D. v. ISABELLA JIMENEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF REFUGIO P.
JIMENEZ, DECEASED; from Dallas County;
5th district (05-07-01354-CV, 264 SW3d 881, 08-13-08, pet denied)(medical malpractice)
08-0084
MCALLEN HOSPITALS, L.P., ET AL. v. CARMEN GARZA MUNIZ, ET AL.; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-06-00288-CV, ___
SW3d ___, 12-13-07, pet. denied June 2008)(medical malpractice, jury verdict)
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Rashid but against the Hospital. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict, and the
Hospital filed a timely notice of appeal. By its first two issues, the Hospital challenges the evidence as legally and factually insufficient
to support the jury's finding that any negligence by the Hospital was a proximate cause of Mr. Muniz's death. By its third issue, the
Hospital contends the trial court erred when it denied the Hospital's motion to strike or limit the causation testimony of Howard
Rosner, M.D., appellants' expert. We affirm.

05-0717
PETER COLDWELL, M.D. v. JOYCE O'NEAL, ET AL.; from Refugio County; 13th district
(13-04-00258-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 07-21-05, pet. denied May 2008)[Dissenting opinion]
as amended, motion to dismiss petition for review dismissed as moot (medical negligence, expert report)

07-0986
MARELYN MEDINA, M.D. v. MICHAEL B. HART; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-04-00436-CV, 240 SW3d 16, 07-05-07, pet.
denied)(HCLC, admission of evidence)
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice lawsuit that was tried to a jury verdict. Appellee, Michael Hart, brought suit against
appellant, Marelyn Medina, M.D., for injuries he sustained during surgery to remove a kidney stone. The jury found Dr. Medina
negligent and awarded damages. On appeal, Dr. Medina argues that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony from a witness
who was not qualified under former article 4590i of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas. (1) Dr. Medina
claims that without this testimony, there was no evidence that she breached the standard of care and that this breach caused
appellee's injury. We affirm.
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Diggdon's testimony, we find that such error was harmless and
did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

08-0140
CYNTHIA HIEGER AND ROY C. HIEGER, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF DAVID C. HIEGER, A MINOR v.
WALGREEN COMPANY; from Harris County; 14th district (14-06-00962-CV, 243 SW3d 183, 10-11-07) [Dissenting opinion in 14-06-
00962-CV] (HCLC, inadequate expert reports)

06-0461
CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION D/B/A CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL SHORELINE AND FRED PURNELL
THOMAS, JR., M.D. v. ROBERT C. RENAUD; from Nueces County; 13th district (13-04-00524-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 04-20-06, pet.
denied)(HCLC, extension of time)
This appeal arises from the trial court's dismissal of a medical malpractice claim brought by appellant, Robert C. Renaud (Renaud),
against appellees, Christus Spohn Health System Corporation d/b/a Christus Spohn Hospital Shoreline (Spohn Hospital) and Fred
Purnell Thomas, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Thomas). By two issues, appellant contends the trial court (1) abused its discretion by denying his
motion to extend time to file a supplemental expert report and granting appellees' motions to dismiss and (2) erred in denying his
motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Andrew Lehrman. We reverse and remand.

07-0003
MANUEL HABABAG, M.D. v. MARY GARCIA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELANY
AVILA, DECEASED, ET AL.; from Jefferson County; 9th district
(09-06-00136-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10-26-06) (HCLC, motion to dismiss)
Appellee Mary Garcia (1) sued appellant Manuel Hababag, M.D. and other defendants for alleged medical malpractice. Hababag filed
a motion to dismiss that challenged appellee's expert report. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(l) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
The trial court denied Hababag's motion to dismiss. We reverse and remand.

07-0950 TAMMIE KAY LEE v. WILLIAM A. BOOTHE, M.D., D/B/A BOOTHE EYE CARE AND LASER CENTER; from Collin County; 5th
district (05-06-00776-CV, 235 SW3d 448, 10-03-07, pet. denied April 2008)(HCLC, failure to file required expert report)
The trial court below dismissed appellant Tammie Kay Lee's claims because she failed to file an expert report as required by chapter
74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Lee contends the trial court erred in dismissing her claims because they were not
health care liability claims and, therefore, not subject to the expert report requirement of chapter 74. After reviewing the record, we
conclude the trial court properly dismissed Lee's claims. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

05-0474 EDWARD GROUP, III, D.C. v. MARK VICENTO; from Harris County; 14th district
(14-04-00908-CV, 164 S.W.3d 724, 05-10-05, pet. denied April 2008) respondent's motion to substitute counsel granted (HCLC,
qualifications of expert for expert report)
In this medical malpractice case, appellant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the
appellee's expert report. In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as a matter of law
because the appellee's expert is not qualified to render an opinion regarding the chiropractic standard of care under Chapter 74 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm.

07-0122
MARGARITA B. ZAVALA v. BRUCE EVAN FOSTER EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF NILES REID FOSTER; from Ector County; 11th
district (11-05-00315-CV, 214 SW3d 106, 12-21-06) (HCLC, expert qualifications) 2 petitions
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. ' 74.351 (Vernon Supp. 2006). In the motion to dismiss, the executor for the estate of Dr. Niles Reid Foster, a podiatrist,
requested that the health care liability claim against Dr. Foster be dismissed because Margarita B. Zavala's expert, Alan C.
Leshnower, M.D., a cardiovascular surgeon, was not qualified to offer an expert opinion on the accepted standard of care for a
podiatrist as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 74.402 (Vernon 2005). The trial court denied the motion, and the executor
for Dr. Foster's estate filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
We reverse and remand.

07-0265
MCKENNA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. AND ROBERT DONOVAN BUTTER, D.O. v. SANDRA QUINNEY; from Comal County; 3rd
district (03-06-00119-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-10-06)
(healthcare liability claim HCLC, interlocutory appeal)
This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises out of a health-care liability claim. Appellants McKenna Memorial Hospital, Inc., and
Robert Donovan Butter, D.O., appeal the trial court's denial of their motions to dismiss appellee Sandra Quinney's lawsuit. They urge
that she failed to provide a sufficient expert report as required by section 74.351 of the civil practice and remedies code. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2006). Because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the
expert report was sufficient, we reverse the trial court's orders and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

07-0439
JORGE MIRANDA, M.D. v. GUADALUPE ADRIANA MARTINEZ, BRYAN POWERS, AND LEMUEL LOPEZ; from Hidalgo County; 13th
district (13-06-00386-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03-08-07) (medical malpractice suit, no expert report)
Appellant, Jorge E. Miranda, M.D., challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the claim filed by appellee, Guadalupe
Adriana Martinez, for failure to provide an expert report and curriculum vitae within the 120-day statutory period. (1) We reverse and
remand.

07-0842
VICTOR HADDAD, M.D. v. CESAR MARROQUIN AND OLGA BROWN; from Hidalgo County; 13th district (13-07-00014-CV, ___ SW3d
___, 08-29-07) (HCLC, appeal of denial of motion to dismiss)
2 petitions
Victor Haddad, M.D. (Haddad) and McAllen Hospitals, L.P., d/b/a/ McAllen Medical Center (McAllen Medical), appellants, filed this
interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's order denying their motions to dismiss appellee, Cesar Marroquin's, health care
liability claim brought against Dr. Haddad and McAllen Medical. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a)(9), 74.351(a)-(b),
(l) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Although Dr. Haddad and McAllen Medical filed separate motions to dismiss and have filed separate
appeals, the issues are sufficiently similar that they can be disposed of in one opinion. We reverse and remand to the trial court.

08-0069
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, AND SARA THOMAS, R.N. v. DIANNA ROSA; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-07-00639-
CV, 240 SW3d 565, 12-07-07)(HCLC, sufficiency of expert report)
In this interlocutory appeal, Baylor University Medical Center (BUMC) and Sara Thomas, R.N. appeal the trial judge's order denying
their objections to Dianna Rosa's expert reports and denying their motion to dismiss. BUMC and Nurse Thomas raise two issues: (i)
error by the trial judge in finding a sufficient expert report and denying their motion to dismiss, and (ii) whether a deposition satisfies
statutory expert report requirements. We affirm the trial court's order.

08-0261
STUART SPITZER, M.D. v. MADELON BERRY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE/ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF TOMMY BERRY; from Henderson County; 12th district (12-07-00276-CV, 247 SW3d 747, 02-22-08) (HCLC,
medical malpractice, expert report, denial of motion to dismiss affirmed)
Stuart Spitzer, M.D., appeals the trial court’s order denying Spitzer’s motion to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit filed against him
by Madelon Berry. In his sole issue, Spitzer argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. We affirm.

08-0296
MIRNA ACOSTA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND, NATURAL PARENT, AND LEGAL GUARDIAN OF DENIS ACOSTA, A MINOR v.
MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL SYSTEM, MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL SYSTEM D/B/A MEMORIAL HERMANN SOUTHWEST
HOSPITAL AND GREATER HOUSTON ANESTHESIOLOGY, P.A.; from Harris County; 14th district (14-07-00001-CV, ___ SW3d ___,
01-22-08)(health care liability, limitations, summary judgment)
Appellant, Mirna Acosta, Individually and as Next Friend, Natural Parent, and Legal Guardian of Denis Acosta, filed suit against
appellees, Memorial Hermann Hospital System, Memorial Hermann Hospital System D/B/A Memorial Hermann Southwest Hospital
(collectively "Memorial Southwest"), and Greater Houston Anestheiology, P.A. ("GHA") asserting various health care liability claims.
Arguing all of appellant's individual claims were barred by limitations, appellees separately filed motions for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. We affirm.

07-0955
DORIS POLLARD v. WALGREEN CO. AND MICHAEL BARNES; from Jefferson County; 9th district
(09-06-00447-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-06-07,pet denied April 2008) (HCLC pharmacist, expert report)
Doris Pollard appeals the dismissal of her personal injury claims against Walgreen Co. and Michael Barnes. Pollard alleged that
Barnes, a pharmacist at a Walgreen pharmacy, negligently filled her prescription with the wrong medication. Walgreen and Barnes
moved to dismiss on the grounds that Pollard failed to file an expert report under the Medical Liability Act

06-0870
MARK S. MAXWELL, D.O. v. DAVID ELKINS AND JUANITA ELKINS; from Taylor County; 11th district
(11-05-00339-CV, 197 SW3d 858, 07-20-06, pet denied April 2008) (HCLC, motion to dismiss)
Dr. Mark S. Maxwell filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss the health care liability
claims of David and Juanita Elkins. We affirm.

07-0982
RICHARD J. HARE, M.D. v. BETTY REED GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SURVIVING SPOUSE AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF LEE GRAHAM; from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02 -07 -00118 -CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10-18-07, pet. denied April 2008)
(HCLC, motion to dismiss denied)
Appellant Richard J. Hare, M.D. asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss with prejudice a lawsuit filed by Betty
Reed Grahan, Individually and as Surviving Spouse and Representative of the Estate of Lee Graham. We affirm.

07-0605
AMY YOUNG, M.D. AND BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE v. SILVIA VILLEGAS AND ARMANDO VILLEGAS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF M.A.V., A MINOR; from Harris County; 14th district (14-06-00072-CV, 231 SW3d 1, 04-03-07, pet.
denied March 2008)(Health care liability claim, immunity claim, interlocutory appeal) (HCLC, suit against medical school, interlocutory
appeal, BCM cases)

07-0709
ENES KANLIC, M.D. v. SHIRLEY MEYER; from El Paso County; 8th district
(08 -06 -00292 -CV, 230 SW3d 889, 07-26-07, pet. denied Mach 2008)
(HCLC, Section 101.106 dismissal, universities as defendants)
Appellant Enes Kanlic, M.D. ("Dr. Kanlic") appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code sections 101.106(a) and (f). Finding no error, we affirm. ... Appellee Shirley Meyer ("Meyer") filed this medical
malpractice action against Dr. Kanlic and Texas Tech University System in July of 2006, citing portions of chapter 74 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74.001-.507 (entitled "Medical Liability").

07-0405
STEPHEN FARMER AND SUSAN FARMER v. MATT SLOAN, M.D. AND PAIN NET PHYSICIANS GROUP, P.A.; from Dallas County; 5th
district (05-06-00247-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 03-22-07, pet. denied March 2008) as amended (HCLC, dismissal proper failure to comply
with expert report requirement)
In a single issue, appellants Matt Sloan, M.D. and Pain Net Physicians Group, P.A. challenge the trial court's order denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that Stephen and Susan Farmer failed to comply with the expert report requirements of section
74.351(b) of the civil practice and remedies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(b) (Vernon 2005). Because we
conclude that the Farmers' claims are “health care liability claims” subject to the requirements of section 74.351(b), we resolve
appellants' issue in their favor. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, render judgment dismissing the Farmers' claims with
prejudice, and remand the case solely for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court incurred by Sloan and Pain
Net.

07-0756
DAVID W. SMITH, D.D.S. AND WIFE, CATHY C. SMITH v. WILLIAM DEAN, M.D. AND CARDIOVASCULAR AND THORACIC SURGICAL
GROUP OF WICHITA FALLS, P.A., D/B/A CARDIOVASCULAR AND THORACIC SURGICAL GROUP OF WICHITA FALLS; from Wichita
County; 2nd district (02 -06 -00042 -CV, 232 SW3d 181, 05-10-07, pet. denied March 2008) (HCLC, jury selection challenged, bias, jury
verdict affirmed)
In this medical malpractice case, appellants Dr. David and Mrs. Cathy Smith appeal the jury's verdict and trial court=s judgment for
appellees Dr. William Dean and the Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgical Group of Wichita Falls, P.A., d/b/a Cardiovascular and
Thoracic Surgical Group of Wichita Falls. In three related issues, appellants argue that several venire members were biased as a
matter of law, that those venire members were not rehabilitated, and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants'
challenges for cause to those individuals. We affirm.

07-0938
HERVY HINER, M.D., H.H. HINER, P.C., SOUTHEAST TEXAS NEPHROLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A., AND MARISA TURNER JOHNSON,
M.D. v. LEE "PETE" BURNELL GASPARD; from Jefferson County; 9th district (09 -07 -00240 -CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-06-07, pet. denied
March 2008) (med-mal suit, expert report)
In this medical malpractice lawsuit brought by appellee Lee "Pete" Burnell Gaspard, appellants Hervy Hiner, M.D., Marisa Turner
Johnson, M.D., H.H. Hiner, P.C., and Southeast Texas Nephrology Associates, P.A. ("STNA") appeal the denial of their motion
challenging Gaspard's expert report. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(l) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Appellants present three
issues for our review. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

07-1015
REGENT CARE CENTER OF LAREDO, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A REGENT CARE CENTER LAREDO AND PAMELA
HUMPHREY v. MARIA D. ABREGO, BERTA VILLARREAL, BEATRIZ HERNANDEZ, RAUL HERNANDEZ, JR., HOMERO PEREZ, AND
DAVID PEREZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES AND LEGAL HEIRS OF THE ESTATE OF MAGDALENA PEREZ,
DECEASED; from Webb County; 4th district
(04 -07 -00320 -CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10-24-07, pet denied Feb 2008) (HCLC, ILA, expert report)
This is an interlocutory appeal in a health care liability case. A nursing home facility, Regent Care Center of Laredo, and its
administrator, Pamela Humphrey, (collectively "RCCL"), challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss under section
74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. RCCL asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to
dismiss because the expert reports offered by appellees Maria Abrego, Berta Villarreal, Beatriz Hernandez, Raul Hernandez, Jr.,
Homero Perez, and David Perez, Individually and as Representatives and Legal Heirs of the Estate of Magdalena Perez, Deceased
(collectively "the Abregos") fail to establish a causal relationship between RCCL's alleged breaches of the applicable standards of
care and the death of Magdalena Perez. Because the Abregos' expert reports are sufficient as to the issue of causation, we affirm.

07-0827
BAYLOR MEDICAL CENTER AT GARLAND v. PATRICIA KETTLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND
KETTLE, DECEASED, LINDA HILL, DIANNE FRANKHAUSER, MARGARET SULLIVAN, THOMAS KETTLE, AND SANDY ROACH; from
Dallas County; 5th district
(05-05-01260-CV, 232 SW3d 832, 08-27-07, pet. denied March 2008)(HCLC dismissal reversed in part)
After Raymond Kettle (Kettle) died, his survivors (the Kettles) brought this wrongful death and survival action alleging medical
negligence by Baylor Medical Center at Garland (Baylor), Cardiology Consultants of North Dallas, P.A. (Cardiology), Abdul Kader
Ezeldin, M.D. (Ezeldin), Kanti Lal Agrawal, M.D. (Agrawal), and Michael Motta, D.O. (Motta). The trial court dismissed the Kettles' claims
with prejudice under the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas (MLIIA) (former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, §
13.01) for failure of the Kettles' pre-trial expert reports to satisfy its requirements. In two groups of eight issues addressing each
defendant, the Kettles argue the court abused its discretion in (i) dismissing the claims and (ii) refusing to grant an extension under
MLIIA § 13.01(g) to file amended reports meeting the statutory requirements. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

07-0935
MICHAEL FAWZY WISSA, M.D. v. MARK VOOSEN, KAREN VOOSEN, AND MARY ELIZABETH ("EMMY") VOOSEN; from Bexar County;
4th district (04 -07 -00386 -CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-26-07, pet. denied Feb. 2008) (Med-Mal suit, ILA, motion to dismiss)
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Dr. Michael Wissa's
motion to dismiss the underlying medical malpractice suit against him. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's order.

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