law-domestication-enforcement-of-foreign-judgment
DOMESTICATION, RECOGNITION, AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN TEXAS
PETITIONS DENIED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
08-0655
DIAMOND OFFSHORE (BERMUDA), LTD. v. SUZANNE ELISABETH HAAKSMAN (AS BENEFICIARY
OF ROBERT DUNCAN BURN QUINN) AND THOMAS JOSEPH MCCARTNEY; from Harris County; 14th
district (14‑06‑00477‑CV, 260 SW3d 476, 04‑24‑08, pet. denied Nov. 2008) (domestication of foreign
money judgment, personal jurisdiction over debtor) (Justice Medina not sitting)
08-0655
DIAMOND OFFSHORE (BERMUDA), LTD. v. SUZANNE ELISABETH HAAKSMAN (AS BENEFICIARY
OF ROBERT DUNCAN BURN QUINN) AND THOMAS JOSEPH MCCARTNEY; from Harris County; 14th
district (14‑06‑00477‑CV, 260 SW3d 476, 04‑24‑08, pet. denied) (domestication of foreign money
judgment, personal jurisdiction over debtor) (Justice Medina not sitting)
07-1039
THE EVEREST GROUP, L.L.C. v. SAMUEL DABNEY WARE; from Dallas County; 5th district
(05-05-01575-CV, 238 SW3d 855, 10-19-07, pet. denied April 2008)(domestication of foreign
judgment reversed)
The Everest Group, L.L.C. (“Everest”) filed an action against Samuel Dabney Ware (“Ware”) to
domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment it owned against Ware. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Everest. Ware timely perfected this appeal. In two issues, Ware argues the trial
court erred: (1) by granting Everest's motion for summary judgment, and (2) by applying a post-
judgment interest rate of 18% to the domesticated foreign judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
we reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
07-0729
JEFFREY WEISS v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. F/K/A MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY
OF NEW YORK; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-06-00940-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07-20-07, pet.
denied Jan 2008) (domestication of foreign judgment, motion for new trial overruled by operation of
law, no hearing, diligence)
A motion contesting enforcement of a foreign judgment operates as a motion for new trial. Karstetter
v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 402 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). When it involves a question of fact, it
is also a motion on which evidence must be heard. See Fluty v. Simmons Co., 835 S.W.2d 664, 668
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (motion for new trial to set aside default judgment is complaint on
which evidence must be heard). We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial
unless the appellant shows the court abused its discretion. Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38
(Tex.1984); Karstetter, 184 S.W.3d at 402. And when a motion for new trial requires the exercise of
discretion, such as where evidence must be heard, the trial court must first be given the opportunity to
exercise its discretion before the appellate court can review whether it abused that discretion. See
Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 667-68. To later complain on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion
when it did not grant a motion for new trial to set aside a default judgment, a party must either present
and obtain a hearing on the motion before it is overruled by operation of law or show it used diligence
in attempting to do so. See Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 668; Capitol State Mortgage Corp. v. Northstar
Mortgage Corp., No. 05-04-01140-CV, 2006 WL 531278, *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas March 6, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op.). If there is no hearing or diligence in attempting to set a hearing before a motion for new
trial is overruled by operation of law, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to
entertain the motion during the court's remaining plenary power. See Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 666;
Capitol State Mortgage, 2006 WL 531278, at *1.