law homestead | home equity loan | property tax appraisal and tax suits |
Substantial changes to the homestead laws of the State of Texas became effective
January 1, 2000. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 51; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 41.002, 41.005
HOMESTEAD CASELAW FROM THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
Lasalle Bank Nat'l Assn. v. White, No. 06-1016, 246 SW3d 616 (Tex. Dec. 21, 2007)(per curiam)
(agricultural homestead, home-equity loan, lien validity)
LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, A/K/A LASALLE NATIONAL BANK, AS TRUSTEE AND LASALLE
NATIONAL BANK, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED JUNE 1, 1999,
SERIES 1999-2 v. LORAE WHITE AND GERALD GEISTWEIDT; from Mason County; 4th district (04-05-00548-CV,
___ S.W.3d ___, 05/03/2006)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petitions for review and without hearing
oral argument, the Court affirms in part and reverses in part the court of appeals' judgment and remands the case
to the trial court.
HOMESTEAD CASE LAW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS (PET. DENIED)
LYLE AND DEBORAH HODGE v. DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT; from Dallas County; 5th district
(05-06-01418-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-19-07, pet. denied Feb 2008) )(property tax appeal, homestead
In this ad valorem tax case, Lyle and Deborah Hodge appeal the trial court's adverse judgment on their claims
against the Dallas Central Appraisal District (DCAD). In three issues, the Hodges challenge the trial court's
judgment regarding a homestead exemption, proration of taxes, and appraisal value. In a fourth issue, they
complain the trial court used an incorrect standard when weighing evidence. Because the issues in this appeal
involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. We affirm.
FLOYD EDGAR HUTSON v. TRI-COUNTY PROPERTIES, L.L.C.; from Parker County; 2nd district
(02-06-00349-CV, 240 SW..3d 484, 11-08-07, pet. denied May 2008)(homestead law, motion for new trial,
preservation of error)
Appellant Floyd Hutson appeals from the trial court's summary judgment decreeing that Tri-County Properties,
LLC is the legal and equitable owner of title to a 48.3 acre tract of real property located in Parker County,
Texas. Hutson brings four issues on appeal: (1) section 34.21 of the Texas Tax Code (which incorporates the
definition of "residence homestead" contained in Texas Tax Code section 11.13(j)(1)) is unconstitutional
because it imposes a more restrictive definition of "homestead" than that contained in the Texas Constitution; (2)
the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and holding that, as a matter of law, Hutson did not timely
redeem the ownership of his property; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Hutson's motion for new
trial based on newly-discovered evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by finding that Tri-County Properties
conclusively established every element of its claim as a matter of law.
Because we hold that Hutson did not preserve his constitutional argument and the trial court properly granted
summary judgment for Tri-County, we affirm.
THE CADLE COMPANY AND CADLEWAY PROPERTIES, INC. v. MARY ESTER ORTIZ AND DAVID ORTIZ;
(Dissenting Opinion) from Calhoun County; 13th district (13-06-00282-CV, 227 SW3d 831, 05-17-07, pet. denied
April 2008) (wrongful foreclosue, mechanics lien, attorneys fees, homestead law)
This appeal arises from a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit. Mary Ester Ortiz and David Ortiz, appellees, obtained a
judgment invalidating a lien on their homestead held by The Cadle Company and Cadleway Properties, Inc.
("Cadle"), appellants. The trial court declared a wrongful foreclosure and also awarded the Ortizes attorneys'
fees. The issues presented are (1) whether a mechanic's lien against a marital homestead is valid if the lien
documents are not signed by both spouses, and (2) whether attorneys' fees are available in a foreclosure case
wherein title ultimately depends upon a deed's construction.
We hold that the mechanic's lien is invalid, and attorneys' fees are available. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's judgment on both issues.
MARY LOU WILCOX AND MICHAEL ROSCOM v. JOHN T. MARRIOTT AND REBECCA MARRIOTT; from
Montgomery County; 9th district (09-05-00469-CV, 230 SW3d 266, 07-12-07, pet. denied March 2008)
(real estate law, lien law, homestead protection)
Mary Lou Wilcox and Michael L. Roscom appeal the judgment entered after a jury trial in a suit filed by John T.
Marriott and Rebecca A. Marriott to enjoin execution on a judgment Wilcox and Roscom obtained against Daniel
Roscom. (1) Wilcox filed the abstract of judgment in Montgomery County on August 4, 1999. Substantial changes
to the homestead laws of the State of Texas became effective January 1, 2000. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 51;
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 41.002, 41.005 (Vernon 2000). Roscom sold the approximately 1½ acre property on
which he and his wife lived to Marriott after the effective date of the amendments. The jury found that Roscom
intended to claim the property as his homestead when he sold it to the Marriotts. The trial court ruled the entire
parcel is included in the homestead exemption from forced sale, and that the judgment lien did not attach to the
property. Wilcox raises five issues on appeal. We reverse and remand for entry of a new declaratory judgment.