law-real-estate-transactions | deeds | conveyances | validity of liens | homestead law |
real estate litigation | declaratory judgment action | specific performance | contract for sale of real
property | statute of frauds
REAL ESTATE LITIGATION CASES ON APPEAL
PENDING PETITION
THE MOTION IN THE FOLLOWING CASE WAS DENIED 7/3/09
09‑0384
WALTER LEE HALL, JR., IN ALL NECESSARY CAPACITY v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS
TRUSTEE, ON BEHALF OF THE HOLDERS OF THE ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH
CERTIFICATES, SERIES NC 2005-HE4, ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST,
AND/OR TRANSFEREES; from Travis County; 3rd district (03-08-00488-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12‑12‑08)
(electronic filing of notice of appeal, timeliness of notice of appeal, sanctions)
motion for temporary relief denied
[Note: The petition for review remains pending before this Court.]
PETITION DENIED
09-0434
LILLIAN MARIAN FOOTE TIGARD, ET AL. v. SEYED HASSAN MOOSAVIDEEN; from Harris County; 1st
district (01-06-00002-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-20-08, pet. denied Sep. 2009)
(lease law, real estate transactions and litigation, purchase option)
We deny appellees' motion for rehearing. However, we withdraw our opinion and judgment of July 26,
2007 and issue this opinion in their stead.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a lessee validly exercised a purchase option before being
notified by the lessor that the lessee was in default on the lease. We also consider whether a lessee can
validly exercise a purchase option despite being in default of the lease. We hold that (1) the lessee
validly exercised the purchase option before being notified that he was in default on the lease, and (2)
the lessee could exercise the purchase option anytime before the contract terminated because the
lease did not contain language in the option clause conditioning its exercise on the lessee's
performance of the terms of the lease. Accordingly, we reverse and render in part and reverse and
remand in part.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the declaratory judgment in favor of the heirs and render judgment declaring that
Moosavideen is entitled to specific performance to exercise the purchase option granted in Article XV of
the lease. We also reverse the portion of the judgment awarding the heirs $88,456.16 in damages
against Moosavideen on their breach of contract claim and render judgment that the heirs take nothing
on such claim. We also reverse the portion of the judgment granting an equitable offset to Moosavideen
and render judgment that he take nothing on such claim. Finally, we reverse the award of attorney's
fees and costs to the heirs and remand both parties' claims for attorney's fees and costs to the trial
court for further proceedings.
09-0690
RAGHBIR SANDHU v. PINGLIA INVESTMENTS OF TEXAS, L.L.C. AND SUMMER PINGLIA; from Harris
County; 14th district (14-08-00184-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-25-09, pet. denied Sep. 2009)(promissory
note suit, SJ for plaintiff affirmed) (commercial real estate transaction: financing of purchase of
shopping center, suit for breach of promissory note, summary judgment procedure, affirmative defenses
not properly asserted in response to Plaintiff's motion, proof of balance due and damages in note suit)
08-0978
PACIWEST, INC. v. WARNER ALAN PROPERTIES, LLC AND WARNER ALAN/WESTCLIFF, LTD.; from
Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-07-00443-CV, 266 SW3d 559, 09-11-08)
This case involves competing motions for summary judgment in a suit over a failed real estate
transaction. The trial court granted summary judgment for the purchaser, appellee Warner
Alan/Westcliff, Ltd. (Westcliff), and appellee Warner Alan Properties, LLC (Warner Alan), Westcliff’s
predecessor-in-interest in the purchase and sale contract. It also ordered that Westcliff was entitled to
specific performance of the contract as a remedy for the seller's default. The seller, appellant Paciwest,
Inc., brings three issues on appeal in which it contends that the trial court erred by sustaining appellees'
objections to Paciwest's summary judgment proof, by denying Paciwest's motion for summary judgment
and granting appellees', and by granting appellees' request for specific performance. In a single issue
in a cross-appeal, appellees contend that the trial court erred by determining that they were precluded
from recovering damages in addition to specific performance because of the election of remedies
doctrine. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.