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TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES: SANCTIONS FOR FILING
UNMERITORIOUS SUIT
Sanctions Order for Filing Debt Suit Against Debtors After Bankruptcy Discharge
Reversed
Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, No. 08-1026 (Tex. Oct. 23, 2009)(per curiam)
(sanctions for filing suit to collect debt discharged in bankruptcy reversed)
UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS v. JAVIER VILLA; from Webb County;
4th district (04-07-00465-CV, 273 SW3d 385, 09-17-08)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Per Curiam Opinion
08-1010 T. CHRISTOPHER ROBSON v. GARRETT GILBREATH AND DAVID GILBREATH; from
Travis County; 3rd district (03-06-00364-CV, 267 SW3d 401, 08‑01‑08)(frivolous suit sanctions,
reasonable inquiry)Rule 13 sanctions for baseless claim of negligent entrustment
Dissenting opinion by Patterson: (Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
sanctioned plaintiffs' counsel T. Christopher Robson for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior
to filing suit. Because the trial court did not have evidence from which it could make required findings
that Robson brought suit in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, I would hold that there was no
evidence from which the trial court could exercise its discretion and reverse the trial court's order. (1)
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.)
COURT OF APPEALS CASES
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
NO. 03-06-00364-CV
T. Christopher Robson, Appellant
v.
Garrett Gilbreath and David Gilbreath, Appellees
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-04-002474, HONORABLE DARLENE BYRNE, JUDGE PRESIDING
O P I N I O N
T. Christopher Robson appeals the trial court's order sanctioning him $10,000 for failure to conduct a
reasonable inquiry prior to filing a negligent entrustment claim against appellee David Gilbreath.
Robson contends that the negligent entrustment claim was not groundless and that he conducted a
reasonable inquiry prior to filing the claim. He also contends that the trial court erred by failing to state
the specific reasons for the sanctions in the order and by imposing sanctions absent evidence that he
filed the negligent entrustment claim in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. We affirm.
Robson represented plaintiffs in a lawsuit against appellees David Gilbreath and Garrett Gilbreath.
The lawsuit concerned an automobile accident that occurred in February 2004 during which a vehicle
driven by Garrett Gilbreath struck and killed Elizabeth Daley, the mother and wife of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
asserted claims against Garrett Gilbreath for negligence and against Garrett's father, David Gilbreath,
"for negligently entrusting a large vehicle, such as his Chevrolet Suburban, to a sixteen-year-old
minor [Garrett] who had little driving experience."
After the first amended petition was filed on November 10, 2004, the parties agreed to postpone
taking depositions until the minor children of the estate of Elizabeth Daley were brought into the case
and the probate matters of the estate of Elizabeth Daley were resolved. On December 3, 2004, Fred
Coogan, attorney for appellees, sent a letter brief to Robson requesting him to dismiss the negligent
entrustment claim against David Gilbreath because it was groundless. Coogan attached a copy of
Garrett's driver's license and an affidavit from David Gilbreath to the letter brief. Robson contends
that he informed Coogan that he would consider nonsuiting the negligent entrustment claim if
appellees' deposition testimony did not provide support for the claim.
On August 5, 2005, appellees filed a no-evidence motion for partial summary judgment and a
traditional motion for partial summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim. In the traditional
motion for partial summary judgment, appellees requested sanctions against Robson "for filing a
groundless claim and/or for failing to nonsuit a groundless claim against Defendant, David Gilbreath."
A hearing on the motions for partial summary judgment was originally scheduled for September 1,
2005. However, on August 23, 2005, the parties agreed that Coogan would cancel the summary
judgment hearing and that the depositions would be postponed until such time as the probate matters
of the estate of Elizabeth Daley were resolved.
The probate court signed and approved a judgment declaring heirship and authorizing letters of
dependent administration in the estate of Elizabeth Daley on January 24, 2006. On March 22, 2006,
Robson filed a motion for continuance of the hearing on appellees' no-evidence motion for partial
summary judgment, which was scheduled for March 30, 2006, arguing that appellees had not
cooperated with several requests for depositions. The court held a hearing on the motion for
continuance on March 30, 2006, and ordered a continuance of the hearing on the motions for partial
summary judgment for at least 40 days for the specific purpose of "tak[ing] defendants' depositions."
David Gilbreath and Garrett Gilbreath were deposed on April 14, 2006. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs
nonsuited their claims against David Gilbreath. On May 2, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on
appellees' motion for sanctions and found "good cause for sanctions because of the failure of
Plaintiffs' counsel [Robson] to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit." It ordered Robson to
pay $10,000 to David Gilbreath. On July 10, 2007, the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement
agreement dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against Garrett Gilbreath. The trial court subsequently
entered a take nothing judgment in favor of Garrett Gilbreath.
The only issue in this appeal concerns the trial court's order sanctioning Robson $10,000 for failure
to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit. A trial court's decision to impose sanctions under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is
shown. Randolph v. Jackson Walker L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions only if it bases its order on
an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Monroe v. Grider,
884 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions against an attorney, a
represented party, or both, who file a pleading that is either (1) groundless and brought in bad faith;
or (2) groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. One purpose of
the rule is to check abuses in the pleading process--that is, to ensure that at the time the challenged
pleading was filed, the litigant's position was factually grounded and legally tenable. Appleton v.
Appleton, 76 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. App.--Houston 2002 [14th Dist.], no pet.). To determine whether
rule 13 sanctions are proper, the trial court must examine the facts and circumstances in existence at
the time the pleading was filed. Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003,
no pet.).
In his first issue, Robson contends that the trial court erred by granting appellees' motion for
sanctions because the claim he filed against David Gilbreath for negligent entrustment was not
groundless. Groundlessness turns on the legal merits of a claim. River Oaks Place Council of Co-
Owners v. Daly, 172 S.W.3d 314, 322 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.). To establish
negligent entrustment of an automobile, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the owner
entrusted the automobile, (2) to a person who was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver, (3)
who the owner knew or should have known was incompetent or reckless, (4) the driver was negligent,
and (5) the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident and the plaintiff's injuries. De Blanc v.
Jensen, 59 S.W.3d 373, 375-76 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (citing Schneider v.
Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987)). An entrustee's previous driving
record or driving habits may show incompetence, recklessness, or intemperance. Revisore v. West,
450 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ). Equal or greater credence
may be attached to the mental or physical condition of an entrustee at the time he is loaned an
automobile. Id.
In this case, Robson did not allege that Garrett Gilbreath was an unlicensed or incompetent driver or
that David Gilbreath knew or should have known that Garrett was an unlicensed or incompetent
driver. Rather, he filed the negligent entrustment claim against David Gilbreath on the basis that
David "negligently entrust[ed] a large vehicle, such as his Chevrolet Suburban, to a sixteen-year-old
minor [Garrett] who had little driving experience." Mere involvement in a collision does not create an
inference or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or reckless. Monroe, 884 S.W.2d at 818.
Furthermore, evidence that a driver is inexperienced, without more, does not permit an inference that
the driver lacked judgment or perception or was otherwise an incompetent driver. See Aboushadid v.
Ward, No. 07-05-00140-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 885, at *8-9 (Tex. App.--Amarillo Feb. 5, 2007, no
pet.) (holding that evidence of sixteen-year-old driver's inexperience does not permit inference that
she lacked judgment or perception or was otherwise an incompetent driver to support a negligent
entrustment claim against the driver's parents). Prior to filing the first amended petition, Robson
received one set of interrogatories from Garrett Gilbreath in which Garrett disclosed that he was
"taking prescription medication" at the time of the accident. Robson contends that this discovery led
him to believe that the prescription medication may have impaired Garrett's driving and that David
Gilbreath may have known of this impairment--facts that, if true, would tend to support a claim of
negligent entrustment. However, Robson did not allege these facts as the basis for the negligent
entrustment claim. Instead, he filed the claim on the basis that David Gilbreath entrusted his large
vehicle to an inexperienced driver. This asserted claim has no basis in law or fact. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the negligent entrustment claim
asserted against David Gilbreath was groundless.
In his second issue, Robson contends that he conducted a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the
negligent entrustment claim. Reasonable inquiry means the amount of examination that is reasonable
under the circumstances of the case. Monroe, 884 S.W.2d at 817. Robson contends that he "pursued
all avenues of investigation that were open and reasonable at the time, including obtaining the full,
investigation file of the Austin Police Department, numerous witness statements, the medical
examiners' report and personal inspection of the accident scene." Having reviewed the record, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Robson did not conduct a
reasonable inquiry prior to filing the negligent entrustment claim. As discussed above, at the time
Robson filed his first amended petition, he had not uncovered any facts tending to show that Garrett
Gilbreath was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver or that David Gilbreath knew or should
have known that Garrett was an incompetent or reckless driver. The issue of whether Garrett was
taking prescription medication at the time of the accident that would impair his driving (he was not)
was not investigated until the defendants were deposed in April 2006. This inquiry should have
occurred before Robson filed a negligent entrustment claim against David Gilbreath. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Robson failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.
In his third and fourth issues, Robson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
state the specific reasons for the sanctions in the order and by imposing sanctions absent evidence
that he filed the claim in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.
In imposing rule 13 sanctions, the trial court is required to state the particulars of good cause
justifying sanctions in the order. See Tex R. Civ. P. 13. Failure to comply with this directive is an
abuse of discretion. Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 135 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2000, no pet.). In this case, the trial court did not state the particulars of good cause for sanctions,
such as whether the negligent entrustment claim was groundless and brought in bad faith or
groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. The order awarding sanctions against
Robson states:
the Court, after considering said Motion, the response, the pleadings on file, the evidence, and
arguments of counsel, finds good cause for sanctions because of the failure of Plaintiffs' counsel
[Robson] to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit.
However, because Robson did not object to the form of the sanctions order, he has waived any
objection to the absence of a bad faith or harassment finding. See Mecom, 28 S.W.3d at 135;
Land v. AT & S Transp. Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.--Austin 1997, no writ). Thus, we
consider whether the record contains any evidence to support an implied finding that the claim was
brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. See Mecom, 28 S.W.3d at 136; McCain v. NME
Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, no writ).
A party acts in bad faith when discovery puts him on notice that his understanding of the facts may
be incorrect, and he does not make reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing a pleading. Monroe,
884 S.W.2d at 819. Improper motive is an essential element of bad faith. Elkins, 103 S.W.3d at 669.
Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but means the conscious doing of a wrong for
dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose. Id.
As previously discussed, Robson asserted a groundless claim of negligent entrustment against
David Gilbreath and failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing his first
amended petition. Robson's contention that Garrett's interrogatory answers led him to believe that
there was a factual basis for the negligent entrustment claim based on Garrett's use of prescription
medication at the time of the accident does not support or explain Robson's filing of the first amended
petition, which alleged a claim of negligent entrustment on wholly different grounds (i.e., that David
Gilbreath negligently entrusted a large vehicle to an inexperienced driver). Robson's failure to make a
reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting a negligent entrustment claim before filing the claim
supports the district court's implied finding of bad faith. See Monroe, 884 S.W.2d at 819. A party
cannot avoid rule 13 sanctions by claiming he was not actually aware of the facts making his claim
groundless when he has not made reasonable inquiry, nor can a party avoid rule 13 sanctions by
claiming he was not acting with malicious or discriminatory purpose in bringing the claim. Id. The
sanctions imposed by the trial court are supported by Robson's failure to make a reasonable inquiry
into the facts supporting the claim that he filed. On this record, we cannot conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against Robson. (1)
Affirmed.
________________________________________________
G. Alan Waldrop, Justice
Before Justices Patterson, Pemberton and Waldrop;
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Patterson
Affirmed on Motion for Rehearing
Filed: August 1, 2008
1. The dissent bases its conclusions on the notion that the trial court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing and did not have before it any evidence that Robson filed his negligent entrustment claim in
bad faith. Robson did not raise the lack of an evidentiary hearing as a point of error on appeal. The
likely reason Robson did not raise this as a point of error is that a hearing on the motion for sanctions
was held before the trial court on May 2, 2006, and the trial court did consider evidence. The hearing
was recorded, and the reporter's record of the hearing is in the appellate record. The evidence
considered by and expressly referenced by the trial court at the hearing was the evidence attached to
the motion for sanctions and the trial court's file. Robson did not object to any of the evidence
attached to the motion nor the trial court's consideration of that evidence or the court's file. In any
event, we are not at liberty to reverse a trial court judgment for a reason not raised in a point of error
unless the error is jurisdictional or fundamental. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.
1993). As for evidence of bad faith, the record reflects that the trial court had before it sufficient
evidence for the court to find bad faith, both circumstantial and direct. The circumstances surrounding
Robson's filing as revealed in the record would allow the trial court, in its discretion, to conclude that
the filing was made in bad faith.
08-1010 T. CHRISTOPHER ROBSON v. GARRETT GILBREATH AND DAVID GILBREATH; from
Travis County; 3rd district (03-06-00364-CV, 267 SW3d 401, 08‑01‑08)(frivolous suit sanctions,
reasonable inquiry)
Dissenting opinion by Patterson: Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sanctioned
plaintiffs' counsel T. Christopher Robson for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit.
Because the trial court did not have evidence from which it could make required findings that Robson
brought suit in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, I would hold that there was no evidence
from which the trial court could exercise its discretion and reverse the trial court's order. (1)
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.