law-takings-claim-inverse-condemnation | eminent domain condemnation | regulatory taking | appraisal
methods
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIM
The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the
consent of such person.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. Adequate compensation does not include profits
generated by a business located on condemned land. Herndon v. Hous. Auth., 261 S.W.2d 221,
222–23 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1953, writ ref’d).
The three part test for identifying a constitutional taking is: (1) the state intentionally performed
certain acts; (2) resulting in a taking of property; (3) for public use. Steele v. City of Houston, 603
S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980).
TAKINGS CLAIM
To establish a takings claim, the claimant must show that a governmental unit acted intentionally
to take or damage property for public use. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d at 643. A person who
consents to the governmental action cannot validly assert a takings claim. Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v.
Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex. 2010).
A person who consents to an action by the government cannot validly assert a takings claim.
Kirby Lake Development, Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Authority, 320 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex.
2010). In Kirby Lake, a group of developers entered into an agreement with a water authority to
build water and sewer facilities and to lease those facilities to the water authority until the authority
purchased them. 320 S.W.3d at 832. The water authority agreed to purchase the facilities for
70% of their cost upon receipt of voter-approved bond funds. Id. The water authority also agreed
to include “in any bond election it [held] subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement bond
authorization in an amount sufficient to pay the purchase price of the Facilities.” Id. at 833. When
the water authority held a bond election omitting the reimbursement provision for approval, the
developers sued, alleging a breach of the agreement and alleging the water authority’s continued
possession of the facilities constituted a taking. Id. at 834. The Texas Supreme Court held that
the developers consented to the taking as evidenced by the agreement and continued to treat the
agreement as still in effect by continuing to demand performance and suing to enforce the
agreement. Id. at 844.
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC,
No. 08-0265 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson) (takings claim against
governmental entity precluded given existence of a statutory remedy which party did not pursue in this
case)
We expect our government to retrieve stolen property and return it to the rightful owner. What happens,
though, when a person claims an interest in property the government has seized? In this case, the City of
Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for
their return. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 47.01a(a). Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the
company sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation.
We hold that the availability of the statutory remedy precludes a takings claim. We reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing this suit.
Conclusion. VSC received all of the process to which it was entitled. A party cannot claim a lack of just
compensation based on its own failure to invoke a law designed to adjudicate such a claim. We
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the case. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(c).
CASE DETAILS: CITY OF DALLAS v. VSC, LLC; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-05-01227-CV, 242 SW3d 584, 01-04-
08)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Justice David
Medina, Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Don R. Willett, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Dale Wainwright delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Phil Johnson and Justice Eva
M. Guzman joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 08-0265 CITY OF DALLAS v. VSC, LLC
City of Dallas v. Stewart, Heather,
No. 09-0257 (Tex. Jul. 1, 2011)(Opinion by Chief Wallace B. Jefferson)(administrative resolution of
dispute over nuisance abatement by city not preclusive, judicial review available, takings claim)
Urban blight threatens neighborhoods. Either as a risk to public health or as a base for illicit activity,
dilapidated structures harm property values far more than their numbers suggest. Cities must be able to
abate these nuisances to avoid disease and deter crime. But when the government sets up a
mechanism to deal with this very real problem, it must nonetheless comply with constitutional mandates
that protect a citizen’s right to her property.
Today we hold that a system that permits constitutional issues of this importance to be decided by an
administrative board, whose decisions are essentially conclusive, does not correctly balance the need to
abate nuisances against the rights accorded to property owners under our constitution.
Independent court review is a constitutional necessity. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment, but on
different grounds.
Conclusion. That the URSB’s nuisance determination cannot be accorded preclusive effect in a takings
suit is compelled by the constitution and Steele, by Lurie and its antecedents, by the nature of the
question and the nature of the right. The protection of property rights, central to the functioning of our
society, should not—indeed, cannot—be charged to the same people who seek to take those rights away.
Because we believe that unelected municipal agencies cannot be effective bulwarks against constitutional
violations, we hold that the URSB’s nuisance determination, and the trial court’s affirmance of that
determination under a substantial evidence standard, were not entitled to preclusive effect in Stewart’s
takings case, and the trial court correctly considered the issue de novo.
We affirm the court of appeals judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(a).
CASE DETAILS: CITY OF DALLAS v. HEATHER STEWART; from Dallas County;
5th district (05-07-01244-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-11-08) The Court affirms the court of appeals' judgment.
Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Justice David
Medina, Justice Don R. Willett, and Justice Debra Lehrmann joined. [pdf]
Justice Phil Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Paul W. Green, and Justice
Eva M. Guzman joined. [pdf]
Justice Eva M. Guzman delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Paul W.
Green, and Justice Phil Johnson joined. [pdf]
Here is the link to e-briefs in case no. 09-0257 CITY OF DALLAS v. STEWART [including 3 amicus briefs]
TAKINGS CLAIM-RELATED CASES FROM THE COURTS OF APPEALS
07-0677
METROCARE EMS, L.P. v. STATE OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR DIVISION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AND TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES; from Jefferson County; 9th
district (09-07-00010-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-07-07, pet denied Feb. 2008)
(governmental entities, sovereign immunity)
From all of the above-discussed jurisdictional evidence, we conclude that MetroCare's declaratory
judgment action is, in fact, a suit against the State for purported contractual reimbursement for which
the State has not waived sovereign immunity. We further conclude that MetroCare has failed to plead and
prove the appropriate requisite intent so as to raise a fact question on whether the State engaged in a
"taking" of any MetroCare-owned property under its eminent domain powers. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227-28. Because an eminent-domain type of taking by the State has not been shown, the State is not
subject to suit under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court erred in denying the
State's plea to the jurisdiction. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order denying the State's plea to the
jurisdiction and dismiss the cause for lack of jurisdiction.
08-0325
SARAH HORTON (NOW STANNARD) v. CITY OF SMITHVILLE, TEXAS; from Bastrop County; 3rd district
(03-07-00174-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 01-25-08, pet. denied June 2008) (nuisance claim, taking, plea to the
jurisdiction sustained, failure to exhaust of administrative remedies)
Also see:
Texas Causes of Action | 2011 Texas Supreme Court Opinions | 2011 Tex Sup Ct Per Curiams
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