law-discrimination-in-employment | retaliation by employer for protected conduct | private employment
disputes | public employees
RECENT TEXAS SUPREME COURT OPINIONS INVOLVING RETALIATION
CLAIMS
City of Waco, Texas v. Lopez, No. 06-0089 (Tex. July 11, 2008)(Opinion by Justice Wainwright)
(Whistleblower Act vs.TCHRA, anti-discrimination statute as exclusive remedy for retaliation claim at issue,
failure to satisfy prerequisites for suit by not filing with agency first)
CITY OF WACO, TEXAS v. ROBERT LOPEZ; from Limestone County;
10th district (10-04-00085-CV, 183 SW3d 825, 12-14-05)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the case.
Justice Wainwright delivered the opinion of the Court.
COURT OF APPEALS CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
DENIED REVIEW
09-0353
LATOYA BASEY v. DAVITA, INC., D/B/A TOTAL RENAL CARE, NELDA BOATWRIGHT, AND FRESENIUS
MEDICAL CARE HOLDING, INC., D/B/A FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE NORTH AMERICA D/B/A NORTHWEST
HOUSTON DIALYSIS, AND BIOMEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF TEXAS, INC.; from Harris County;
14th district (14-07-00925-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 02-24-09, pet. denied July 2009)
(employment dispute, disability discrimination, retaliation, sj for defendant affirmed)
09-0190
DR. NYLA PTOMEY v. TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY; from Lubbock County;
7th district (07-06-00332-CV, 277 SW3d 487, 01-20-09, pet. denied July 2009)
(age discrimination and sex discrimination and retaliation claims rejected)
09-0227
BILL M. RANKIN v. GREG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS; from Bowie County;
6th district (06-07-00149-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-10-08)(employment dispute, termination, charge of
discrimination untimely)
On March 31, 2005, fifty-four-year-old Bill M. Rankin was demoted from his position as office manager in the
Texarkana office of the Texas Attorney General (Abbott) to office supervisor in the Paris, Texas, office,
allegedly because he had failed to meet child-support-collection quotas. On May 4, Rankin refused to take
the Paris position and, as a result, was "constructively terminated" that day. Rankin's resulting administrative
charge of age discrimination was filed October 12, 2005. (1) Abbott sought to dismiss Rankin's subsequent
lawsuit for want of jurisdiction on the basis that Rankin had not timely filed his administrative charge of
discrimination. (2)
We reverse the trial court's denial of that motion to dismiss and render judgment dismissing Rankin's suit for
want of jurisdiction. Our ruling is based on our conclusion that Rankin was required, yet failed, to file suit
within 180 days after he was told of his demotion.
08-0664
LIMESTONE COUNTY, TEXAS v. LAURI J. ANDERSON; from Limestone County; 10th district
(10-07-00174-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07-02-08)(employment law, termination of employment, sex
discrimination, retaliation claim, adverse employment action, causal nexus, filing deadline for administrative
complaint under Texas Labor Code, exhaustion of administrative remedies)
motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction dismissed as moot
(Justice Willett not sitting)
Anderson challenges the County’s grounds for summary judgment, contending that: (1) she established a
prima facie case of both gender discrimination and retaliation; (2) she exhausted administrative remedies;
(3) her claims fall within the scope of her charge of discrimination; and (4) DeFriend’s reasons for
termination were pretextual.... Having found that fact issues exist as to Anderson’s gender discrimination
claim, we reverse the judgment on the discrimination claim and remand this cause to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Lauri J. Anderson sued Limestone County for retaliation and gender discrimination. The County filed
traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Anderson
appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by granting the County’s motion for summary judgment; (2)
the County failed to disprove any element of her claims; (3) she produced more than a scintilla of evidence
on each issue challenged by the County; and (4) the County’s summary judgment evidence was defective.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.